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SEEING THROUGH THE LI(E)BOR:
REFORMING THE LIBOR REFORMS
Bruce Gordon Luna 1I*
INTRODUCTION
During the height of the subprime mortgage market collapse and
the beginning of the Great Recession,' market watchers began to
raise questions about the integrity of the London Interbank Offered
Rate (LIBOR).2 As one of the foundations of the global financial
system, LIBOR is a daily interest rate benchmark based on the
interest rates at which banks borrow unsecured funds from other
banks in the London wholesale money market (or interbank market),
and is used as the base rate in financial transactions valued between
an estimated $300 trillion to $800 trillion. 3 LIBOR affects
businesses seeking credit, consumers obtaining mortgages or
personal loans, students obtaining educational loans, employees'
pension funds, and market participants transacting in numerous other
financial contracts in the U.S. and abroad.
In 2008, financial media began to note that LIBOR, the most
widely used reference rate benchmark in the world,4 and a leading
indicator of bank financial health, was not as volatile as one would
expect given the market turmoil. Additionally, several leading
1 See Peter Coy, The Great Recession: An 'Affair' to Remember,
BLOOMBERG (October 11, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201
2-10-11/the-great-recession-an-affair-to-remember.
2 See Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC News (Feb. 6, 2013)
[hereinafter Libor Timelinel, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business- 18671255.
For background information on what LIBOR is, see The Basics, BBALIBOR,
http://www.bbalibor.com/explained/the-basics [hereinafter The Basics] (last
visited June 7, 2014).
MARTIN WHEATLEY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL
REPORT 76 (2012) [hereinafter THE WHEATLEY REVIEW], available at
http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatleyreview-libor-finalreport 280912.pd
f.
4 John Kiff, What is LIBOR?, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2012 at 32, 32-33.
5Libor - What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, BBC NEws (Dec. 18,
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19199683.
6See Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Cast Doubt on
Key Rate, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2008, at Al.
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economic indicators, which normally correlated positively with
LIBOR, began to move in the opposite direction. The "spread"
between LIBOR and the TED spread 8 --the difference between the
interest rates on interbank loans and short-term U.S. government
debt-has historically been very close, but began to diverge
dramatically.9 In addition, the rates for credit default swaps widened
for certain banks while their LIBOR submissions remained steady.o
The LIBOR submissions of the contributing banks to the British
Bankers' Association (BBA)-the private group that oversaw
LIBOR until NYSE Euronext took over in January of 201411-
suggested that borrowing costs remained static during the economic
upheaval, while other leading economic indicators clearly suggested
the banks were experiencing significant credit deterioration. 12
On August 12, 2011, the numerous claims filed against LIBOR
contributor banks were consolidated into a multi-district litigation
before the United Stated District Court for the Southern District of
New York.13 At the heart of the litigation was the contention that a
cartel of banks had manipulated LIBOR, resulting in billions of
dollars of damages to stock market investors, pension funds,
community banks, local governments, and participants in the
7Id.
8 The "TED Spread" is a measurement of the interest rate difference
between the three-month Treasury bill rates and the three-month LIBOR
benchmark rate. Understanding the TED Spread, UNDERSTANDING THE
MARKET (Oct. 16, 2008, 9:55 AM), http://understandingthemarket.com/
?p=51.
9 See Mollenkamp, supra note 6.
10 See Mollenkamp, supra note 6. Credit default swaps, or "CDS," are
derivatives contracts entered into by parties to hedge the risks of certain
potential events, such as bankruptcies or insolvencies. See Janet Tavakoli,
Introduction to Credit Derivatives and Credit Default Swaps, TAVAKOLI
STRUCTURED FIN., http://www.tavakolistructuredfinance.com/cds/ (last
visited June 7, 2014). CDS are typically structured similar to insurance
contracts, whereby one party will pay a "premium," typically tied to LIBOR,
in exchange for future payments from the counterparty if a potential risk
becomes a reality. See id
"1 Press Release, NYSE Euronext, NYSE Euronext Subsidiary to
Become New Adm'r of LIBOR (July 9,2013), www.nyse.com/press/137336
5567815.html.
12 See Mollenkamp, supra note 6.
13 In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F. Supp. 2d
666 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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commercial lending and real estate markets. 14 In an attempt to
mitigate the impending storm of litigation, banks rushed to finalize
government settlements 5 and terminated the traders implicated in the
fraudulent submissions.' 6 Despite predictions, however, the wave of
litigation expected by the legal and financial community failed to
materialize, and several class action lawsuits were subsequently
dismissed in whole or in part.17 Nevertheless, regulators in the US
and the UK continue their long-standing investigations into LIBOR
manipulation, and in certain cases have initiated criminal
investigations of certain bankers." In 2012, the UK enacted a
number of reforms designed to address certain failings in the LIBOR
submissions process. It is unclear, however, whether these reforms
will prevent any future manipulation of the benchmark. Without
additional reforms of the LIBOR calculation process, including even
the possibility of replacing LIBOR as the primary benchmark for
international finance, the risk of future manipulation will continue to
exist.9
14 See Jerry Kronenberg, How a Libor Scheme Works and What It
Means to Consumers, BOsTON GLOBE, July 07, 2012, http://www.bostonglo
be.com/business/2012/07/06/alleged-libor-scheme-could-affects-borrowers-
investors/HeDX3KnsEH3IvhbV8bGkJM/story.html.
'5 See Michael Ovaska & Margot Patrick, The Libor Settlements, WALL
ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014241278873246166045
78302321485831886 (last visited June 7, 2014).
16 Emma Rowley & Harry Wilson, Barclays Has 'Disciplined' 13,
Fired Five Over Libor Scandal, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 28, 2012, 4:21 PM),
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scandal/9709314/Barc
lays-has-disciplined-13-fired-five-over-Libor-scandal.html.
"See Peter J. Henning, In Libor Ruling, a Big Win for the Banks, N.Y.
TIMEs (April 1, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/in
-libor-ruling-a-big-win-for-the-banks/?_php--true&_type=blogs&_r-0.
1s See Chad Bray, Investigation Expands, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, at
B9; John Waggoner, Libor Scandal Explained and What Rate-Rigging
Means to You, USA TODAY (July 18, 2012, 7:25 PM), http://usatoday30.
usatoday.com/money/perfi/credit/story/2012-07-18/libor-interest-ratescanda/
56322230/1.
19 See Justin O'Brien, Market Manipulation and the Failure of
Compliance: How Barclays Destroyed the Integrity of the LIBOR, U.N.S.W.,
http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/compliance/market-manipulation-and-f
ailure-compliance-how-barclays-destroyed- integrity-libor (last visited June
5, 2014).
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This article argues that the LIBOR calculation structure is still
flawed, and that the enacted reforms will not completely reduce the
risk of future manipulation. LIBOR will continue to be at risk for
manipulation by traders and management at contributor banks unless
the relevant regulators intervene to mandate greater transparency and
provide incentives for additional reform. The first part of this article
will examine the importance and extent that LIBOR plays in the
financial markets. The second part of this article will analyze the
status of the ongoing LIBOR scandal, including criminal
investigations and litigation. Finally, this article will analyze current
reform proposals and suggest specific additional regulatory regimes
to limit the risk of future market manipulation. Although a majority
of commercial market participants may never have heard of LIBOR,
or only have the most tenuous grasp of its impact on modem finance,
restoring the legitimacy of LIBOR is essential to restoring investor
faith in the financial system.
I. OVERVIEW OF LIBOR
The scope of the LIBOR manipulation scandal cannot be grasped
without understanding the ubiquitous presence of LIBOR in
everyday commercial transactions. LIBOR was formulated in the
mid-1980s in response to the development of new market instruments,
specifically interest rate swap contracts, foreign currency options and
forward rate agreements. 20 These new financial instruments,
although providing new areas of investment and growth opportunities,
required a measure of uniformity in calculating market risk.2 In
October 1984, the BBA established the BBA standard for interest
rate swaps, or "BBAIRS."22 By January 1986, BBAIRS had evolved
into what is now LIBOR.23 Currently, there are over 200 LIBOR
20 See Michael J. de la Merced, Q. and A.: Understanding Libor, N.Y.
TIMES (July 10, 2012, 10:38 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/q
-and-a-understanding-libor/; Panels, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/
panels (last visited Aug. 1, 2013) (providing the currencies marked to
LIBOR: Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Swiss franc, Danish krone, euro,
sterling, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Swedish krona, and U.S. dollar).
21 See Kiff, supra note 4.
22 See J. BAINS ET AL., LIBOR: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1 (2013),
available at http://www.excelian.com/uploads/libor-paperl.pdf (last visited
June 3, 2014).
23 id.
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panel members, representing sixty nations. 24 Even after the
widespread publicity surrounding the manipulation scandal, LIBOR
continues to be the benchmark for the vast majority of financial
transactions.25 It is used in calculating interest rates for everything
from business loans, commercial and residential mortgage loans,
investment products in pension funds, derivatives contracts, and
money-market funds.26
LIBOR is intended to represent the interest rate at which large
banks may borrow unsecured funds from other banks.27 Prior to the
recent LIBOR reforms, there were fifteen various short-term
maturities, ranging from overnight to one year, and ten currencies in
which LIBOR was measured, resulting in 150 different LIBOR
benchmark rates.28 Each business day, between 11 a.m. and 11:10
a.m., the contributing banks submit to Thomson Reuters, the
designated calculation agent for the BBA, the interest rate they
expect to pay on an unsecured loan from another bank. 29
Submissions are confidential, and the rates are released to the public
only after final publication of the LIBOR rates by Thomson
Reuters. 30  The top and bottom quartile of submitted rates are
disregarded, and the average of the remaining rates becomes the
LIBOR benchmark rate for that day.31 For example, with respect to
three-month U.S.-dollar LIBOR, eighteen banks make up the
24 David Enrich & Max Colchester, Before Scandal, Clash over Control
ofLibor, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2012, at Al.
25 See id.
26 What is LIBOR and Why do LIBOR Interest Rates Move Closely in
Line With Short-Term Interest Rates in the US.?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
S.F. (July 2006), http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2
006/july/libor-interest-rates-london-interbank-offered.
27 See The Basics, supra note 2.
28 See Waggoner, supra note 18.
29 See The Basics, supra note 2.
31 The BBA is an unregulated trade association representing the British
banking and financial services industry comprised of 170 member banks and
70 Associate member firms. See What Is the BBA, BBA, http://www.bba.
org.uk/about-us (last visited June 5, 2014). BBA defines the term LIBOR
and the criteria a panel bank is required to use in making its submissions,
selects the banks for the LIBOR panels for each currency, and oversees the
process of LIBOR submissions and publication of LIBOR. See Bbalibor
Explained, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/explained (last visited June
5,2014).
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contributor panel that determines the benchmark rate. 32 After
disregarding the upper and lower quartile of submitted rates, data
from only ten banks calculate the three-month U.S.-dollar LIBOR at
any one time.33 The exclusion of the top and bottom quartiles is
designed to remove outliers from the calculation process. 34 Once
published, the LIBOR rate is used to set interest rates on transactions
in the lending, securities, derivatives, and currency markets. 's
Lenders use LIBOR in pricing loans, adding an increment designed
to capture the risk of default by the borrower.36  Collusion by
contributor banks to artificially set the LIBOR benchmark rate-
whether to protect their reputation during the financial crisis or to
take advantage of their positions on specific financial transactions-
had a significant impact on global markets.37
The LIBOR scandal has its basis in built-in incentives by
financial institutions and individual traders to manipulate LIBOR.
The ability to manipulate the LIBOR benchmark rate, even in tiny
fractions of a basis point, could lead to massive overpayments or
underpayments, in certain situations, by both borrowers and lenders.
Borrowing banks (and other borrowers throughout the integrated
financial system) benefit from lower rates, while lending banks (and
other lenders throughout the integrated financial system) benefit from
higher rates.39 Individual contributor banks' positions on derivatives
contracts also may have motivated banks to artificially move the
32 US Dollar Panel, BBA LIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/panels/usd
(last visited June 1, 2014) (listing the banks in the U.S. dollar panel). Three-
month USD LIBOR is one of the more widely used LIBOR benchmarks; see
de le Merced, supra note 20.
3 Matthew Jensen, The Uses of LIBOR and the Victims of Its






3 See Francesco Guerrera, UK Regulator Defends Libor Role, WALL
ST. J., July 10, 2012, at Cl.
38 Jensen, supra note 33.
See Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Libor Lies Revealed in Rigging of
$300 Trillion Benchmark, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.bloombe
rg.com/news/2013-01-28/libor-lies-revealed-in-rigging-of-300-trillion-bench
mark.html.
2014 SEEING THROUGH THE LI(E)BOR: 225
REFORMING THE LIBOR REFORMS
benchmark rate.40 Because LIBOR is an indicator of the financial
health of a contributing bank, the divergence of LIBOR marks
against other economic indicators that typically correlated positively
with LIBOR suggested that contributing banks were manipulating
their LIBOR marks up or down to appear more financially stable than
they were in reality.41 As a result of the contributing banks' ability to
manipulate LIBOR, these false marks may have tremendously
impacted global markets and market participants. 42 Outside of
shoring up a bank's public image of financial health in times of
market turmoil, individual traders, with bonuses based on
performance, had personal incentives to influence LIBOR rates to
meet financial targets during periods of normal market activity.43
A. COMMERCIAL AND MORTGAGE LENDING
LIBOR is a primary feature in commercial and mortgage
lending." Rather than using long-term, fixed-rate loans, commercial
banks have adopted the use of variable-rate loans based on LIBOR in
order to hedge against market risks in making certain loans, including
construction loans, floating rate bridge loans, and mini-permanent
financing. 45 Typically, commercial loans are set by a "spread" above
LIBOR, and the rate resets periodically over the life of the loan.46
Manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark, therefore, means that even a
small upward movement of one hundred-thousandth of an interest
rate point can result in significant changes in payments by
commercial obligors.4 7 Alternatively, any downward pressure on
LIBOR means that significant commercial lending was mispriced,
40 Non-prosecution Agreement between United States Department of
Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, and UBS AG (Dec. 18 2012) app.
A, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/6942012121911725
320624.pdf.
41 See Libor -What Is It and Why Does It Matter?, supra note 5.
42 See id.
4 See, e.g., The Rotten Heart of Finance, EcONOMIST, July 7, 2012, at
25-27 [hereinafter Rotten Heart].
4 See Waggoner, supra note 18.
45 See David Bodamer, What the LIBOR Scandal Means for Real Estate,
NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR (Sep. 12, 2012, 11:21 AM), http://nreionline.com
/finance-amp-investment/what-libor-scandal-means-real-estate.
46 See Sara Schaefer Mufioz, The Libor Investigation: How Libor Affects
Rates on Loans, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2012, at A5.
47 see, e.g., id.
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resulting in lower returns for lenders. 4 8 For example, an estimated
7,000 small and medium-sized banks lost approximately $448
million in total revenue due to understated LIBOR marks.49
LIBOR is also used to determine certain borrowing rates for
consumers and corporations with respect to approximately $10
trillion in commercial and residential mortgage loans. so
Approximately 900,000 outstanding residential home loans
originated between 2005 and 2009-the period of suspected LIBOR
manipulation-totaling approximately $275 billion in outstanding
principal.5 1 And over the last decade, an estimated 12 million or
more adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) loans originated in the U.S.,
totaling over $3.5 billion. 52 Any manipulation of these LIBOR-
indexed ARM loans means that borrowers potentially paid more in
interest than they should have paid.53  Alternatively, if LIBOR-
indexed interest rates were pushed downward, then ARM mortgagees
likely paid less than the appropriate market rate. 54 With a market
worth trillions, even slightly adjusted interest rates could potentially
48 See id.
49 Christopher Elias, Libor Manipulation-The Fallout, Bus. L.
CURRENTS (July 20, 2012), http://currents264.rssing.com/browser.php?indx=
3625122&item=8.
so Octavio Nuiry, LIBOR: Rigged Interest Rates, Rigged Real Estate,
REALTYTRAC (July 6, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/ content/news-and-
opinion/libor-rigged-interest-rates-rigged-real-estate-7286.
51 Shahien Nasiripour, Effect of Libor on US Loans Examined, FIN.
TIMES, July 12, 2012, at 19.
52 REPUBLICAN STAFF OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM., BRIEF ON THE LIBOR
SCANDAL: WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE DON'T, AND WHAT TO EXPECT 3
(2012) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN STAFF BRIEF], available at
http://www.jec.senate.gov/republicans/public/?a=Files.Serve&File id=5906a
359-6ecd-4aba-ba23-ae71706575a6. Adjustable-rate mortgages, more
commonly referred to as "ARMs," are mortgage loans with interest rates that
are subject to periodic change. See BD. OF GOVERNORS, FED. RESERVE SYS.,
CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 4 (2012),
available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_CFPBARMs-
brochure.pdf. Typically, ARMs are tied to certain indexes, like LIBOR, that
govern the interest rate fluctuation. See id. at 7-8. For example, a standard
ARM loan would set the interest rate on the outstanding principal balance of
a mortgage loan at LIBOR plus 2.0%, with the additional 2.0% representing
the originating lender's price for making the loan. See id. at 8-9. For a
complete discussion on ARM loans, see generally id.
53 See Waggoner, supra note 18.
54 see id
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mean damages worth billions of dollars to both mortgagors and
mortgagees.
Over a five-year period ending in January 2012, an estimated 4
million or more Americans lost their homes to foreclosure.5s With
the realization that contributing banks may have manipulated LIBOR,
the question arises as to how many of these former homeowners were
faced with artificially increased interest payments.
B. FINANCIAL MARKET IMPA CT
LIBOR affects the stock market in three fundamental ways: (1)
the pricing of LIBOR is a signal to investors of the perceived health
of individual banks, and as a result can impact the related stock
prices; (2) it is the foundation for setting the interest rate on LIBOR-
based investments such as money-market funds and short-term bonds;
and finally (3) LIBOR is used in setting the costs relating to the
futures and interest rate swap markets. First, banks that reported
(via understated LIBOR rates) lower borrowing costs than their
actual borrowing costs were indicating to the public that their internal
financials were in better shape than they actually were.57 According
to documents released to the public as part of the Barclays PLC
(Barclays) settlement, LIBOR contributor banks felt that market
turmoil created incentives to lower LIBOR submissions in order to
reassure investors, governmental regulators, and counterparties that
there was no problem with the interbank lending market.5 8 These
artificially lower LIBOR submissions by certain contributor banks
pressured other contributor banks to do the same. 59 For example,
55 Les Christie, Foreclosures Fall to Lowest Level Since 2007, CNN
MONEY (Jan. 12, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/12/real
estate/foreclosures/index.htm.56 See REPUBLICAN STAFF BRIEF supra note 52 at 3-4.
57See James Nye, LIBOR Scandal Set to Rock US. as Experts Warn It
Could Be 'The Biggest Consumer Fraud in History', DAILY MAIL ONLINE
(July 12, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2172377/LIBOR-scandal-rocks-US-experts-warn-biggest-consumer-fraud-hi
story.html.
58 See In re Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital,
Inc., 2012 WL 2500330, *18 (C.F.T.C. 2012) [hereinafter In re Barclays].
5 See Christopher Alessi & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Understanding the
Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/united-
kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729 (last updated June 5, 2014).
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Barclays' management believed that artificially lower LIBOR
submissions by the other contributor banks led both market watchers
and media to assume that Barclays was having liquidity problems
because the LIBOR rate it submitted was significantly higher than
the rates submitted by other banks. 60 To combat this perception, it
was alleged that senior management at Barclays directed the traders
responsible for LIBOR submissions to make lower submissions in
order to align Barclays' submissions with the other contributor
banks. 61 As a result, between 2005 and 2009, Barclays submitted
altered LIBOR rates for multiple tenors on a regular basis.62 That act
of alteration alone may have affected how investors made decisions
with respect to where they directed their banking business, as well as
which bank stocks they chose to buy and sell. Following the
publicized settlements, contributor banks that were fined for LIBOR
manipulation have seen their individual stock prices experience sharp
market declines. 63
Second, LIBOR affects many money-market funds and short-
term bonds. 64 Therefore, manipulations of LIBOR would have
impacted the amount of interest paid on and the market value of such
investments. For example, any downward manipulation of LIBOR
would have decreased the amount of interest received by an investor
in a money-market fund indexed to LIBOR, while any upward
60 See Mark Gilbert, Barclays Takes a Money-Market Beating,
BLOOMBERG (Sep. 3, 2007, 4:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/new
s?pid=newsarchive&sid=a8uEKKBYY7As.
61 See Caroline Binham et al., Barclays Top Brass Face Fresh Libor
Heat, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013, 7:59 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/
9f3ea72e-6652-le2-919b-00144feab49a.html#axzz2paFp4Qru. During the
financial crisis in October 2008, conversations between Bob Diamond, then-
CEO of Barclays, and officials at the Bank of England, indicate that some of
Barclays' management believed that the U.K. government supported
Barclays' move to keep LIBOR submissions artificially low in order to
maintain the financial system. See Parmy Olson, Amidst Libor Scandal, Bob
Diamond Feared Barclays Would Be Nationalized, FORBES (July 4, 2012,
12:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2012/07/04/amidst-
libor-scandal-diamond-feared-barclays-would-be-nationalized/.62 See Rotten Heart, supra note 43.
63 See George Hay, Libor Fallout Could Trash UK Bank Earnings
Again, REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS (June 28, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2012/06/28/idUKL3E8HS4AT20120628.
6 Kirsten Grind, The New Basics: What Libor Means for You, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 4, 2012, at B8.
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manipulation of LIBOR would have decreased the market value of
any outstanding bonds indexed to LIBOR (as the market value of a
bond tends to move inversely to subsequent changes in the relevant
interest rate).
Finally, market participants are not just affected by potentially
higher or lower payments from investments in LIBOR-indexed
financial products, but also by the interest rate hedges that these
market participants enter to protect themselves against future swings
in interest rates based on LIBOR.66  Interest rate swap products
frequently use LIBOR for determining pricing.67 Any mispricing of
LIBOR necessarily would result in the mispricing of interest rate
swap contracts as well.68 Derivatives contracts during the period of
alleged LIBOR manipulation fluctuated in value from $449 trillion in
notional value at the end of 2009 to almost $700 trillion in notional
65 See id.
66 See generally JAMEs J. BOUDREAULT, HEDGING BORROWING COSTS
WiTH EURODOLLAR FUTURES AND OPTIONs (2010), available at
http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/files/IR-301_Hedging_ Borr
owingCosts withEDFuturesandOptions.pdf (providing an example on
how interest rate hedges affect market participants). Interest rate swaps, also
referred to as interest rate hedges, are financial contracts between
counterparties looking to exchange the risks associated with a certain
investment or pool of investments that they hold. See Robert T. Daigler &
Donald Steelman, Interest Rate Swaps and Financial Institutions 4-5 (Nov.
1988) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.fiu.edu/-daiglerr/
pdf/swaps.pdf. Typically, one party holds a fixed-interest position, while the
other holds a floating-rate position. See id. at 4. The fixed-rate position
holder will pay the floating-rate position holder a floating-rate premium,
while the floating-rate position holder will pay the fixed-rate position holder
a fixed-rate premium. See id. The effect of this transaction is to essentially
"swap" the risk each party is holding. See id at 6-7. Parties enter into
interest rate swap transactions when a previously held investment becomes
subject to interest exposure, thereby increasing or decreasing their potential
liability. See, e.g., id at 5. Banks often act as intermediaries in these
transactions, passing the related premiums between the hedge counterparties
for a fee in exchange for insuring against the potential default of one of the
parties. See id. at 8.
See Matt Taibbi, Everything is Rigged: The Biggest Price-Fixing
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value at the end of 2013.69 Even movements of the LIBOR
benchmark by a fraction of a basis point could potentially result in
damages worth millions. Fundamentally, the LIBOR scandal left
investors and regulators to make decisions based on incorrect data.
C. MARKET CONFIDENCE
The subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent taxpayer funded
bailouts severely damaged the reputation of the banking industry.70
The addition of a scandal at the heart of the financial system-the
LIBOR debacle-has the potential to contract credit and continue to
damage the already battered faith that market participants have in the
financial industry. Financial market participants rely on LIBOR as an
agreed upon framework for entering into a variety of financial
transactions.7' As a result, the widespread perception that LIBOR is
a flawed benchmark likely has impacted the decision making of
69 In re Barclays, supra note 58, at *I ("According to the Bank for
International Settlements ('BIS'), over-the-counter interest rate derivatives,
such as swaps and Forward Rate Agreements ('FRAs'), comprised over $449
trillion in notional value at the end of 2009, and over $500 trillion in notional
value at the end of 2011."); Steve Denning, Big Banks and Derivatives: Why
Another Financial Crisis is Inevitable, FORBES (Jan. 8, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/08/five-years-after-the-fi
nancial-meltdown-the-water-is-still-full-of-big-sharks/; see Letter of Final
Notice from William Amos, Head of Retail Enforcement, FSA Enforcement
& Crime Div., to Barclays Bank Plc (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter FSA Final
Notice Barclays 2012], available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/d
ocuments/barclaysjFSAO6272012.pdf; Daniel P. Collins, Barclays False
Reports "Pervasive", FUTUREs (June 28, 2012), www.futuresmag.com/
2012/06/28/barclays-false-reports-pervasive. A notional amount refers to the
face amount of credit protection that is being purchased or sold. See
Denning, supra. Notional amounts are then used to determine the premium
payments to be paid or received by hedge counterparties. See id.
70 See Consumers Icy Feelings Toward Bankers Finally Starting to
Thaw, FIN. BRAND (Aug. 26, 2013), http://thefinancialbrand.com/33050/ga
llup-consumer-banking-reputation-survey/; see also Martin Fridson,
Facebook, JPMorgan, LIBOR - Will Scandals Kill the Stock Market?,
FORBES (July 13, 2012 10:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/investor/20
12/07/13/facebook-jpmorgan-libor-will-scandals-kill-the-stock-market/; Ed
O'Leary, Reputation Risk in the Loan Department, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Nov.
1, 2013), http://www.ababj.com/blogs-3/talking-credit/item/4175-reputation-
risk-in-the-loan-department.
71 See Grind, supra note 64.
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investors and financial institutions around the world. 2 Over the past
five years, since market watchers began to suspect that LIBOR was
being manipulated, investors have withdrawn over $500 billion
dollars in investments from the equity markets and the number of
investors that state they have reduced faith in the functioning of the
stock market has more than doubled.73
Despite increased regulation and internal reforms--or perhaps
because of them-there is discussion among many LIBOR
contributor institutions over whether to continue to take part in the
LIBOR process. In February 2013, U.K. regulators warned both
BNP Paribas and Rabobank not to relinquish their membership as
LIBOR contributor banks. LIBOR contributor banks have several
reasons to consider leaving the LIBOR panel. The loss of faith in the
LIBOR process itself has undermined the ability of banks to ascertain
the likelihood of default when determining whether to make loans to
other banks. A lack of liquidity between banks increases potential
market instability. Moreover, regardless of a LIBOR panel
member's actual participation in the scandal, LIBOR panel members
are concerned about the potential liability of being associated with
the settlement process. 76 The end result is that financial actors as
well as investors have less trust in the banking system in a world
where faith in the integrity of regulators and financial actors is
critical for a fully functioning market.
To date, investigations into the rate-rigging scandal show no sign
of abating, and it continues to affect market confidence in the
banking system. Its ubiquitous use requires that faith be restored in
the LIBOR calculation system as quickly as possible.
72 See Fridson, supra note 70.
7 Id; see also, Associated Press, Investors Across Globe Remain
Cautious Five Years After Onset of Great Recession, OREGONLIVE (Oct. 7,
2013), .http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2013/10/investors-acr
oss globe remain.html.
74 David Enrich, Banks Warned Not to Leave Libor, WALL ST. J., Feb.
14, 2013, at Cl.
7 See id.
76 See id.
77 See, e.g., Aaron Task, Why the LIBOR Scandal Matters: Destruction
of Confidence to the Nth Degree', YAHOO FiN. (July 10, 2012, 10:45 AM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/why-libor-scandal-matters-destru
ction-confidence-nth-degree- 144511452.html.
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II. THE LIBOR SCANDAL
On June 27, 2012, Barclays admitted to regulators in the U.S.
and the U.K. that its traders had manipulated the LIBOR benchmark
rate for a four-year period beginning as early as 200578 Barclays
agreed to pay approximately $435 million in fines to U.S. and U.K.
authorities and to cooperate with U.S. and U.K. authorities in their
continuing investigations. Soon after, on December 19, 2012,
Swiss bank, UBS AG (UBS), and its subsidiary, UBS Securities
Japan Co., Ltd. (UBS Japan), were fined approximately $1.2 billion
for their role in LIBOR manipulation by the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Commodities and Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC), approximately $259.2 million by the U.K.'s
Financial Services Authority (FSA), and approximately $64.3 million
by Swiss banking authorities.80  Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)
became the third major international bank to settle claims of LIBOR
manipulation, settling for £87.5 million ($147 million) with U.K.
regulatory authorities, $325 million with the CFTC, and $150 million
with the DOJ to resolve the investigations. 81 Almost every other
78 See Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC
Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of
and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest
Rates (June 27, 2012) [hereinafter CFTC Barclays Press Release], available
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12; FSA Final
Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69, at 2-3; see also Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct Related to
Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank
Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012)
[hereinafter U.S. DOJ Barclays Press Release], available at http://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
7 See CFTC Barclays Press Release, supra note 78; U.S. DOJ Barclays
Press Release, supra note 78.
80 See Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n,
CFTC Orders UBS to Pay $700 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of
Manipulation, Attempted Manipulation and False Reporting of LIBOR and
Other Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012) [hereinafter CFTC UBS
Press Release], available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases
/pr6472-12 (noting the $500 million fine imposed by the US DOJ in addition
to the $700 million fine by the CFTC).
81 Press Release, Royal Bank of Scot., RBS Reaches LIBOR
Settlements (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www.rbs.com/news/2013
/02/rbs-reaches-libor-settlements.html. Additionally, it should be noted that
all British Pound Sterling and Euro figures will be accompanied by the
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LIBOR contributor is under investigation for potential manipulation
of LIBOR or other related benchmarks by various international
authorities. 82 While governments around the world initiated new
investigations or continued their current investigations into the
LIBOR scandal, aggrieved parties commenced independent and class
action suits against the alleged conspirator banks. Recently, several
class action lawsuits against financial institutions for LIBOR
manipulation have been dismissed in the Southern District of New
York. To date, it is unclear how significantly this dismissal will
inhibit or influence future litigation.
The race by governmental authorities and LIBOR contributor
banks to settle claims of LIBOR manipulation on the one hand, and
the move by plaintiffs to seek redress in the courts against the alleged
manipulators on the other, facilitated the issuance of proposed
reforms and their subsequent enactment by U.K. authorities within a
year of Barclays' settlement with U.S. and U.K. authorities. It is
unclear, however, whether the proposals enacted to reform the
LIBOR calculation process will prevent LIBOR from future
manipulation. This section of the Article will discuss how the
LIBOR manipulations were discovered, the status of the
governmental investigations underway in the U.S. and U.K., and
review the status of current litigation in U.S. federal courts against
the LIBOR contributor banks. Finally, this section will summarize
currently enacted reforms. Despite the various litigations, continuing
investigations into LIBOR manipulation, and rushed reforms, little of
this process is devoted to substantively remedying the structural
problems with the calculation and use of the LIBOR benchmark.
A. BACKGROUND
In late 2007, financial watchers began to notice irregularities in
the setting of short-term interest rates, particularly with respect to the
derivatives markets. 83 LIBOR fluctuates based on market predictions
foreign exchange rate provided by http://www.xe.com at 2:00 PM on June 7,
2014. Those rates are 1 Pound Sterling = 1.68050 USD and I Euro=
1.36425 USD respectively.
82 See Kylie MacLellan, Factbox: Banks Drawn into Libor Rate-Fixing
Scandal, REUTERS (July 11, 2012, 10:18 AM), http://www.reuters.com/articl
e/2012/07/1 l/us-banking-libor-panel-idUSBR
E86A0P02012071 1.
83 See Vaughan & Finch, supra note 39.
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for future interest rates, the liquidity cost for lending, and the cost of
providing credit. 84 Specifically, certain financial analysts noted
interest rate divergences between the LIBOR benchmarks, the rates
banks expected to make on unsecured loans, and EURIBOR
benchmarks, the rates European banks set for making loans to each
other.85 Both theoretically, and in practice, LIBOR and EURIBOR
rates tend to move in the same market direction. 6 Starting in 2007,
however, along with the subprime market turmoil and the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, bankers and interest-rate swap traders began
noticing LIBOR and EURIBOR benchmark rates moving away from
each other: LIBOR rates moving downward, and EURIBOR rates
moving upward. In addition, financial analysts also commented on
the divergence between LIBOR and the TED spread as an indicator
that financial institutions were hiding solvency issues. Frequently
used as a method of fraud detection, the application of Benford's
Law to the LIBOR submissions also seemed to indicate manipulation
of the benchmark.
In September 2007, the financial press started publishing their
suspicions regarding the abuse of the LIBOR benchmark. 90 The
84 See The Basics, supra note 2.
85 Peter Gumbel, Libor Manipulation: The Markets' Worst-Kept




88 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, My Friend TED, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14,
2008, 4:04 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 2008/03/14/my-friend-
ted/?_php-true&_type=blogs&_r-0. The TED Spread refers to the
difference between the interest rate for the 3-month Treasury bills and the 3-
month U.S. dollar LIBOR benchmark rate. Id. Typically, the TED spread is
considered an indicator on the cost of money globally, as well as the
financial health and liquidity of financial institutions. See Definition of Ted
Spread, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=Ted-spread
(last visited June 6, 2014).
89 Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, et al., Tracking the Libor Rate, 18 APPLIED
ECON. LETTERS 893, 894-95 (2011). Benford's Law, alternatively known as
the first-digit law, is a mathematical principle used to analyze the frequency
and distribution of numbers in data sets. See id. at 894; see also The Scam
Busters, EcoNoMisT, Dec. 15, 2012, at 76.
90 See Gillian Tett, Libor's Value is Called into Question, FIN. TIMES
(Sept. 25, 2007, 9:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c7dd45e-6b9c-
1 ldc-863b-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2aonoEXTz ('The Libor rates are a bit
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"smoking gun" for financial reporters was the sudden divergence
between reported LIBOR benchmarks and the cost of credit-default
swaps. 9 1 At the same time, following the collapse of Bear Steams,
financial regulators and industry insiders began publicly questioning
the LIBOR benchmarks at meetings of bond trading associations (and
even in government publications) on the basis of market data.92
B. GOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS AND LITIGA TIONS
The LIBOR scandal is already global in nature: governmental
investigations are ongoing in the United States, the United Kingdom,
Canada, the European Union, Switzerland, and Japan.9' The DOJ,
SEC, CFTC, and seven other international regulatory agencies have
resolved investigations or are continuing to investigate more than a
dozen banks on the nature and extent of LIBOR manipulation.94 To
date, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, JPMorgan
Chase, RBS, Bank of America, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ,
Lloyds TSB, HSBC, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, West LB,
Norinchukin, and UBS have either settled claims of LIBOR
manipulation or they continue to be under investigation by regulatory
authorities.95
of a fiction. The number on the screen doesn't always match what we see . .
. ."'); see also Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 6 (questioning the
veracity of LIBOR).
91 See, e.g., Simon Kwan, Behavior of Libor in the Current Financial
Crisis, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. LETrER (Jan. 23, 2009), http://www.frbsf.
org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2009/january/libor-finan
cial-crisis/; see also Libor Scandal: How I Manipulated the Bank Borrowing
Rate, TELEGRAPH (July 1, 2012, 11:02 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/newsbysectorlbanksandfinance/9368430/Libor-scandal-How-I-mani
pulated-the-bank-borrowing-rate.html.
92 See, e.g., Kwan, supra note 91; Libor Scandal: How I Manipulated
the Bank Borrowing Rate, supra note 91.
9 See Rotten Heart, supra note 43; Taibbi, supra note 67 (quoting
Andrew Lo, a professor of finance at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, that the LIBOR scandal "dwarfs by orders of magnitude any
financial scams in the history of markets")
94 See Karen Freifeld, U.S. Credit Union Regulator Sues Global Banks
over LIBOR (Sep. 24, 2013, 9:12 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/
09/24/ncua-libor-suits-idUSL2NOHJ29J20130924?irpc=932.
95 See Cora Currier, LIBOR Scandal Timeline: What Did the Fed Know
and When Did it Know it?, PROPUBLICA (July 25, 2012, 10:41 AM),
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The investigations into LIBOR rigging started with a single
email from a Barclays employee in August 2007.96 The whistle-
blower widely distributed the email, specifically including officials at
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). In the email, the
whistle-blower noted that LIBOR contributions were lower than the
rates at which the contributing LIBOR banks could actually borrow.97
Subsequent mass emails noting lower than expected LIBOR
benchmarks continued throughout the year.98 Responding to these
emails, FRBNY analysts began to focus on the LIBOR benchmarks
and began interviewing Barclays employees. 99 One such employee
told FRBNY analysts that the lower LIBOR rates were in direct
response to negative press received when "honest LIBOR"
benchmarks had been submitted.'00
By mid- to late-2008, regulatory authorities in the U.S. and U.K.
were aware of the industry concerns regarding LIBOR.' Initially,
regulator conduct focused directly on reforming the LIBOR
submission process rather than investigating the conduct of the
banks.102 However, little progress was made in refining the LIBOR
calculation process. At the time, concerns over the stability of the
financial system mandated that most of the attention be focused on
restoring industry confidence in LIBOR. 0 3 In June 2008, Timothy
http://www.propublica.org/special/libor-scandal-timeline-what-did-the-fed-k
now-and-when-did-it-know-it. A complete analysis of every government's
investigation into LIBOR manipulation is beyond the scope of this Article,
which will be limited to the status of the investigations in the U.S. and U.K.
96 Libor Timeline, supra note 2.
9 See id.
98 See id.
99 See Unofficial Transcript of Phone Call from Fabio Ravazzolo,
Employee of NY Fed. Res. Bank, to Employee of Barclays (Apr. 11, 2008),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/libo
r/April 11 2008 transcript.pdf.
lolSee Alexander Eichler, Geithner Libor Memo Expressed Concern
over Rate's 'Integrity' in 2008, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2012, 11:30 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/13/geithner-libor_n-1671211 .html.
101 See Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, Bernanke, Geithner Response to Libor
Scandal Rings Hollow, REUTERS (July 27, 2012, 2:06 PM), http://www.r
euters.com/article/2012/07/27/usa-fed-libor-idUSL2E8IQ9VX20120727.
102 See id.
103 Brooke Masters & Philip Stafford, Scandal-Plagued Libor Moves to
NYSE, FIN. TIMEs (July 9, 2013, 7:28 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7
3332222-e87f-l le2-aead-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2uDMYLc2M.
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Geithner, then-President of the FRBNY, emailed a list of
recommendations to Mervyn King, then-Governor of the Bank of
England.104 Geithner's email proposed a number of changes to the
LIBOR settlement process, including the following: (1) the LIBOR
calculation process should be subject to a new and credible reporting
process; (2) the number and size of U.S. dollar LIBOR contributors
should be expanded; (3) incentives should be added to eliminate the
misreporting of LIBOR; (4) a second calculation time should be
added for U.S. dollar LIBOR for the U.S. market; (5) LIBOR
contributor banks should publish the transaction size for their
individual LIBOR marks; and (6) LIBOR contributing banks should
report those LIBOR maturities that result in a net benefit to the
related reporting bank. 105 The BBA's response to Geithner's
suggestion was less than overwhelming; the BBA only published a
consultation paper for its members to review and voluntarily
implement.106
Even though there were repeated market indicators of
widespread LIBOR manipulation, U.S. and U.K. regulators
consistently failed to investigate or attempt to prevent LIBOR
manipulation in a timely manner. 107 And, upon the initial
investigation, regulators did little to prohibit the manipulation.' 08
104 New York Fed Responds to Congressional Request for Information
on Barclays - LIBOR Matter, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (July 13, 2012), http://w
ww.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/BarclaysLIBORMatt
er.html.
105 E-mail from Timothy Geithner, President of the Fed. Reserve Bank
of N.Y., to Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of Eng. (June 1, 2008, 10:00
PM), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/
news/2012/nr068.pdf.
106 See id; see also David Milliken & Timothy Ahmann, Bank of
England Says it Acted on Geithner's Libor Email, REUTERS (July 13, 2012,
1:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/us-banking-libor-geith
ner-idUSBRE86C08G20120713 (quoting Angela Knight, who stated that
"There is no show stopper as far as we can see").
107 See Douwe Miedema, Two Senators to Block U.S. Treasury Nominee
over Libor, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2012, 7:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/arti
cle/2012/11/15/financial-regulation-nominee-idINL I E8MEIUE20121115.
los See Libor Rate-Rigging: UK Regulator Failed to Act on Warnings of
"Low-Balling", MERCOPRESS (Mar. 5, 2013, 4:52 PM), http://en.mercopress.
com/2013/03/05/libor-rate-rigging-uk-regulator-failed-to-act-on-warnings-of
-low-balling ("[T]he regulator either ignored or failed to follow up on a
series of red flags highlighting problems with the rates.").
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Even after becoming aware of the investigations into LIBOR
manipulation, certain LIBOR contributor banks and their traders
continued to engage in manipulation of the benchmark through at
least 2010.'09 At least initially, there seemed to be little concern by
U.S. and U.K. regulatory authorities over the extent of the
manipulation. 110 Further, there is some indication that the
management of certain LIBOR contributor banks felt that U.S. and
U.K. regulatory authorities were, at the least, willing to turn a blind
eye to these activities while the global economy was continuing to
suffer from the fallout of the Great Recession.
To date, despite the nature and extent of these investigations and
resulting litigation, the LIBOR setting process has only been
incrementally reformed. Following the publication of the Wheatley
Report,112 and the implementation of the recommended Wheatley
Report reforms, governmental investigations continue to focus
primarily on the nature and extent of the wrongdoing, and not enough
on reforming the LIBOR rate setting process.
1. UNITED KINGDOM
The FSA began its investigation into LIBOR rigging by the
contribution panel banks in March 2009, approximately two years
after it was first alerted to the possibility of LIBOR misconduct. 13
On June 27, 2012, the FSA finalized a settlement resulting from its
109 See Vaughan & Finch, supra note 39.
110 See id.
11 See, e.g., Patrick Hosking, FSA Chief Turned Blind Eye to
Allegations ofLibor Abuse, TIMES, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/in
dustries/banking/article3706490.ece (Mar. 6, 2013); Ben Protess, New York
Fed Turns over New Libor Documents, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2012, 7:08
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/new-york-fed-turns-over-new
-libor-documents/ ("[A] Barclays employee told a New York Fed official
that 'we know that we're not posting um, an honest' rate. The employee
suggested that other big banks posted similarly phony reports, saying that
Barclays wanted to 'fit in with the rest of the crowd."'); see also Ben Protess,
Geithner Tried to Curb Rate Rigging in 2008, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012,
10:04 PM) [hereinafter Protess, Geithner], http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012
/07/12/geithner-was-aware-of-problems-with-key-interest-rates/?_r =0.112 See infra Part II.C.1.
113 See Protess, Geithner, supra note I 11.
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investigation into LIBOR manipulation by Barclays.'1 4 In its report,
the FSA disclosed the widespread nature of LIBOR manipulation,
not just internally at Barclays, but in the greater banking industry as
well."'5 In addition to subsequent settlements with other banks, the
FSA has continued its investigations into LIBOR rigging." 6
The FSA investigation into Barclays centered on transaction
reporting control methodology and their failure to provide accurate
transaction reports. "' Under Supervision 17 of the FSA
Handbook,"t8 and Principle 3 of the FSA's Principles of Business," 9
banks were required to submit reportable transactions to the FSA by
the close of the following business day.120 This information is used
by the FSA to monitor for market abuse, such as insider trading and,
of course, LIBOR manipulation.121 In the course of its investigation,
the FSA discovered substantial discrepancies in the data Barclays
submitted to the FSA, and its corresponding public data, between
2005 and 2009.122 As part of its investigation, the FSA discovered
over 257 internal messages between Barclays' desk traders asking for
LIBOR submissions to be moved higher or lower than Barclays'
actual borrowing costs. 123 Initially, LIBOR manipulation by
Barclays' traders was a response to what was perceived as negative
and unfair media reporting on Barclays' financial health due to its
high LIBOR submissions.124 In internal market reports prepared by
the senior LIBOR submitter for the U.S. dollar, Barclays was
submitting benchmark rates higher than other banks, which were
114 See generally FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69
(providing the specifics of the settlement agreement).
"
5 Id. at 2, 3, 5, 10.
116 See Lindsay Fortado & Ben Moshinsky, Seven Banks Under UK.
Libor Investigation as FSA Criticized, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2012, 5:57 AM)
[hereinafter Seven Banks], http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-16/sev
en-banks-under-u-k-libor-investigation-as-fsa-criticized.html.
"' See FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69, at 3-4, 31-35,
39-40.
"
8 See FSA Handbook Online, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY, SUP 17.3.1
http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/SUP (last visited June 5, 2014).
"
9See FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69, at 39.
120 FSA Handbook Online, supra note 118, at SUP 17.2.7.
121 See id. at SUP IA.3.1.
122 See In re Barclays, supra note 58, at *2.
123 See FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69, at 11.
124 See Gilbert, supra note 60.
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submitting 'unrealistically low' benchmarks. 125 Media and market
participants, based on Barclays' submissions, assumed that the bank
was having liquidity problems.126 Consequently, management at
Barclays directed the traders responsible for LIBOR submissions to
lower their submissions with respect to the daily U.S. dollar LIBOR
tenor. 127 Internal reports indicate that the senior U.S. dollar LIBOR
submitter knew that the submitted benchmarks were inaccurate and
lower than the actual borrowing costs for Barclays.' 28 At the height
of the financial crisis in 2007, there was little to no interbank lending
as few banks were willing to lend for terms longer than one month.129
Despite the lack of actual rates to determine LIBOR benchmarks, it
appears that Barclays continued to determine LIBOR submissions
based on their concern over reputation rather than factors such as
transaction size and actual transactions. 3 0
Despite being made aware of potential LIBOR manipulation as
early as 2007, 131 governmental investigation into LIBOR
manipulation began in the U.S. in 2008 and approximately in March
of 2009 in the U.K.132 As part of the investigation into LIBOR
manipulation, U.S. and U.K. authorities discovered emails written by
traders at Barclays that included requests to have Barclays' LIBOR
contribution "kicked out" of the average.' 33 In discovered telephone
125 In re Barclays, supra note 58, at *15.
126 See Gilbert, supra note 60.
127 See Taibbi, supra note 67, at 2.
128 See FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69.
129 Carol C. Bertaut & Laurie Pounder, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Financial
Crisis and US. Cross-Border Financial Flows, 95 FED. RESERVE BULL.
A147, A148 (2009); Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas J. Klagge, The Federal
Reserve's Foreign Exchange Swap Lines, CURRENT ISSUES EcON. & FIN.,
Apr. 2010, at 2.
130 CFTC Barclays Press Release, supra note 78.
131 See Libor Timeline, supra note 2.
132 See Philip Aldrick, UK Regulators 'in Denial' Over Libor Rigging,
MiPs Claim, TELEGRAPH (July 17, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9406965/UK-regulators-in-den
ial-over-Libor-rigging-MPs-claim.html ("US confidence in the London
market was being severely shaken . . . by the slow reaction time of the
London authorities. They had to be continuously prodded by us."); David
Enrich & Max Colchester, Libor Fallout Hits Other Banks, Watchdog -
Embattled FSA is Under Fire for its Policing of Rate Setting, WALL ST. J.,
July 6, 2012, at Cl; Seven Banks, supra note 116.
"3 See FSA Final Notice Barclays 2012, supra note 69, at 11.
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conversations, traders responsible for the bank's LIBOR submissions
stated they would "see what [they] [could] do" with respect to
requests for low LIBOR submissions.134 Even more damning were
the frequent emails sent with explicit requests for LIBOR
manipulation. 135
Factors other than reputation may have influenced decisions to
manipulate the LIBOR benchmarks as well. Traders had significant
incentives to manipulate LIBOR. Typically, banker salary structures
included significant year-end bonuses based on departmental
performance for the year. 136 As performance was measured by
profits, traders had every incentive to push for altered LIBOR
submissions if the manipulated LIBOR rate would facilitate meeting
performance goals.' 3 7 Rather than recognizing the significance of
these activities, the FSA characterized the LIBOR manipulation as a
case of "inadequate systems and controls."' 3 8
Barclays ultimately settled with the FSA for only f59.5 million
($99.9 million) after qualifying for a 30% reduction of its fines for
settling quickly and cooperating with the authorities.' The FSA's
final notice provided that Barclays "commit[ed] extensive resources
to improve" reporting. 140 It is unclear, however, to what extent
Barclays has actually reformed its practices and procedures following
the FSA's investigation. Moreover, following the announcement of
its settlement with the FSA, Barclays' stock price actually rose by
134 id.
135 See id at 11-14; see also In re Barclays, supra note 58, at *7-9
(illustrating examples of the requests, including a November 22, 2005
message from a senior trader in New York to a Trader in London included
the following: 'WE HAVE TO GET KICKED OUT OF THE FIXINGS
TOMORROW!! We need a 4.17 fix in I. . . We need a 4.41 in 3m . . ."').
136 See Louise Story, Wall St. Profits were a Mirage, but Huge Bonuses
were Real, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at Al.
13 See id.
138 Press Release, Fin. Services Auth., Barclays Fined £59.5 Million for




140 UK's Financial Services Authority Fines Barclays £2.45m for
Failures in Transaction Reporting, MONDO VISIoNE (Sept. 8, 2009),
http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/news/uks-financial-serv
ices-authority-fines-barclays-245m-for-failures-in-transaction/.
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more than 7% as investors interpreted the settlement as a formal
clearing of any wrongdoing. 14 1
Formal publication of the settlement between FSA and Barclays
not only provided other banks with a roadmap for their own
settlement process,142 but it also provided discoverable information
for litigants.143 Soon after the Barclays settlement, Swiss bank UBS
entered into settlement negotiations with regulators in the U.S., U.K.,
and Switzerland for LIBOR manipulation for the period between
2006 and 2009. 144 Similar to the investigation of Barclays,
management and traders at UBS were found to have submitted
LIBOR rates at prices higher or lower than the market indicated,
thereby trying to influence actual interest rates to the benefit of
internal transactions. 14 In particular, the investigation of UBS
indicated that specific traders were responsible for the altered
submissions, including attempts to influence other third-party banks
to change their LIBOR submissions. 146 As with Barclays,
management at UBS also was found to have provided guidance to
traders to submit benchmarks that would influence market and
investor perception of UBS's liquidity and creditworthiness.14 7 UBS
settled these claims for approximately $1.4 billion.148
In February 2013, RBS was fined £87.5 million ($147 million)
for manipulation of yen-denominated, U.S. dollar-denominated, and
141 See Martin Baccardax, Barclays Shares Rise After Profits Top
Forecasts Amid Libor Scandal, INT'L Bus. TIMES (July 27, 2012, 8:11 AM),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/367437/20120727/barclays-libor-diamond-
scandal-fine-litigation.htm.
142 Alexandra Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays Paying $453 Million to
Settle Libor Probe, REUTERS (June 27, 2012, 11:11 PM), http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2012/06/27/uk-barclays-libor-idUKBRE85QO PM20120627.
143 C. Cowden W. Rayburn, The LIBOR Scandal and Litigation: How
the Manipulation of LIBOR Could Invalidate Financial Contracts, 17 N.C.
BANKING INST. 221, 221-24 (2013).
'ADavid Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS in Talks Over $1 Billion
Penalty, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012, at Al.
145 David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in
'Epic'Plot, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, at Al.
146 d
147 Id.
148 LIBOR Settlements, UBS, http://www.ubs.com/global/en/aboutubs
/media/global/libor.html (last visited June 5, 2014).
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Swiss franc-denominated LIBOR benchmarks.149 The investigation
into RBS's LIBOR manipulation found that twenty-one bankers had
been involved with over two hundred requests for altered LIBOR
submissions.150 Although the investigations into RBS's manipulation
of LIBOR did not find any misconduct by RBS's senior management,
regulators attribute the amount of RBS's fine to the improper
submissions as well as the results of an earlier review by FSA in
March 2011, whereby RBS submitted a false statement regarding the
adequacy of its internal LIBOR systems and controls.' 5 The U.K.
government's ownership of RBS may explain the quick settlement by
RBS with U.K. regulators.1 52
In addition to regulatory fines and penalties, the U.K.'s Serious
Fraud Office (SFO) pursued criminal charges against those in
connection with LIBOR manipulation. 53 The SFO is the U.K.
regulatory authority responsible for investigating and prosecuting
serious and complex frauds.1 54 The SFO considers a number of
criteria in determining whether to bring an action for fraud, including
whether the alleged fraud is a matter of public concern and whether
the result of any fraud is more than f 1 million ($1.68 million).1s In
December 2012, the SFO arrested three men in connection with the
LIBOR scandal: Thomas Hays, a former trader at UBS and
Citigroup, and Terry Farr and Jim Gilmour of RP Martin, a British
149 Press Release, Fin. Conduct Auth., RBS Fined £87.5 Million for





152 The U.K. Treasury owns 82% of RBS following a bailout by the U.K.
government during the financial crisis in 2008. See Banking: RBS Files its
Defence Against £4bn Lawsuit, GUARDIAN, Dec. 14, 2013, at 46.
1s3 Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, LIBOR: Three Arrested (Dec.
11, 2012), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releas
es/press-releases-2012/libor--three-arrested-.aspx.
154 Who We Are, SERIous FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-
us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited June 4, 2014).
1s5 See Shanaz Musafer, Libor Scandal and the Law, BBC NEWS, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18671228 (last updated July 3, 2012); Jill
Treanor, After Barclays, Other Banks are in Our Sights over Interest Rates,
Warns FSA, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2012, 4:38 PM), http://www.theguardian.co
m/business/2012/jun/27/barclays-other-banks-inte rest-rates-fsa.
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brokerage firm.156 All three men were charged with conspiracy to
defraud.157 Hays stated that the manipulation went "much higher
than me."'5s The Criminal and Antitrust Divisions of the U.S. DOJ
and the FBI also have pursued criminal investigations against these
individuals.159
Unlike in the United States, litigation over the LIBOR
manipulation has lagged in the U.K. Interest rate swap counterparties
have sued both Barclays and Deutsche Bank AG for breach of
implied representations regarding the accuracy of each bank's
LIBOR submissions.160 To date, Barclays has settled the litigation
out of court, while no decision has been made in the Deutsche Bank
litigation.16'
2. UNITED STATES
Unlike the FSA, the Treasury Department initiated its
investigations into the LIBOR scandal almost immediately after
FRBNY alerted them to the problem by the FRBNY.162 The FRBNY
156 Ben Protess & Mark Scott, Rate Inquiry Accelerates with Arrests in
London, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 2012, at BI.; Harry Wilson & Jonathan
Russell, Three Arrested in SFO LIBOR-Rigging Investigation, TELEGRAPH
(Dec. 11, 2012, 8:40 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scan
dal/9737068/Three-arrested-in-SFO-Libor-rigging-investigation.html.
157 Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Trader Charged in Libor
Investigation (June 18, 2013), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room
/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2013/trader-charged-in-libor-
investigation.aspx; Lindsay Fortado, Ex-RP Martin Brokers Farr, Gilmour
Charged in Libor Probe, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2013 12:20 PM), http://w
ww.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-15/ex-rp-martin-brokers-farr-gilmour-cha
rged-in-libor-probe.html.
158 David Enrich, Global Finance: More UK. Charges on Libor, WALL
ST. J., July 16, 2013, at C3.
159 See Libor Manipulated in 2008: FDIC Joins the Action, Sues 16,
HUE & CR1: CURRENT EVENTS NOTE BLOG (Mar. 14, 2014), http://huecri.
wordpress.com/tag/tom-hayes/.
160 See Graiseley Properties Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Plc, [2013] EWCA
(Civ) 1372; Max Colchester, UK. Court Allows Investors' Libor Suits,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2013, at B2.
161 See Colchester, supra note 160.
162 Chris Isidore, Barclays Admitted False Libor Reports to Fed in '08,
CNN MONEY (July 13, 2012, 9:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/13
/investing/geithner-liborbarclays/index.htm.
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was aware of the LIBOR manipulation as early as September
2007.163 Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the FRBNY
received reports from external sources regarding "problems with
LIBOR."i 64 The FRBNY began circulating its findings to U.S.
Treasury officials as early as May 2008. 165 As market insiders
continued to report LIBOR manipulation, a confidential report
entitled "Market Concerns Regarding LIBOR" was distributed
internally at the FRBNY and to U.S. Treasury officials on June 5,
2008. 166 The report summarized the FRBNY's findings, its
communications with the BBA, and the BBA's responses to the
FRBNY's suggestions of potential reforms.' 67
As various agencies became aware of the possibility of LIBOR
manipulation by multiple LIBOR contributor banks, the CFTC began
investigating the possible "lowballing" of LIBOR benchmark rates in
Fall 2008. 168 The SEC began its investigation into the LIBOR
problem by early 2009.169
163 Id.
164 New York Fed Responds to Congressional Request for Information
on Barclays - LIBOR Matter, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. (July 13, 2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/Barclays LIBO
R_Matter.html; see Dennis Kuo et al., A Comparison of Libor to Other
Measures of Bank Borrowing Costs (June 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economists/vickery/Libor
KSV staff webpage.pdf.
See Isidore, supra note 162.
166 See generally Samuel Chuen & Matt Raskin, Presentation to the
Interagency Financial Markets Group Meeting of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York: Market Concerns Regarding LIBOR, FED. RES. BANK N.Y.
(June 5, 2008), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2012/1
ibor/June_5_2008_presentationtoIFMGM.pdf (providing a general
overview of LIBOR manipulation).
167 New York Federal Reserve Knew About Libor Rate-Fixing Issues as
Far Back as 2007 and Proposed Changes but Were Ignored, DAILY MAIL
ONLINE (July 10, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2171646/Libor-scandal-New-York-Federal-Reserve-knew-rate-fixing-issues-
far-2008.html.
168 Peter Gumbel, LIBOR Rigging: What the Regulators Saw (but Didn't
Shut Down), TIME (July 16, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/16/libor
-riggin -what-the-regulators-saw-but-didnt-shut-down/.
TE Philip Aldrick, Barclays: How the Libor Scandal Unfolded,
TELEGRAPH (June 27, 2012 9:44 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/n
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In conjunction with its settlement with the FSA, Barclays, UBS,
and RBS also have entered into settlements with the CFTC and the
Department of Justice for their misconduct in manipulating
LIBOR.o7 0 To settle charges with the CFTC and the DOJ, Barclays
agreed to pay $160 million in fines in June 2012.' On December
19, 2012, the CFTC initiated proceedings against UBS and UBS
Japan for engaging in LIBOR manipulation for profit and for issuing
false LIBOR benchmarks to protect its reputation.' 72 As part of the
order, UBS was fined $700 million and directed to institute
immediate changes to its internal controls regarding LIBOR rate
submissions. 173 Concurrently with the CFTC's order, the U.S.
Department of Justice released an agreement between itself and
UBS. 7 4 Although the DOJ contemplated criminal charges against
UBS, the agency decided against it in consideration of preventing
additional market upheaval. 1' In February 2013, U.S. and U.K.
regulators fined RBS and RBS Japan $612 million for regulatory and
criminal penalties.17 6 Currently, regulators in the U.S. and the U.K.
continue to investigate additional financial institutions over the rate-
ewsbysector/banksandfinance/9360469/Barclays-how-the-Libor-scandal-unf
olded.html.
170 Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC
Orders The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and RBS Securities Japan Limited to
Pay $325 Million Penalty to Settle Charges of Manipulation, Attempted
Manipulation, and False Reporting of Yen and Swiss Franc LIBOR (Feb. 6,
2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6510-
13.
1' Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits
Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate
and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-
crm-815.html; CFTC Barclays Press Release, supra note 78.
172 See CFTC Barclays Press Release, supra note 78.
174 William P. Barrett & Janet Novack, UBS Agrees to Pay $780
Million, FORBES (Feb. 18, 2009, 7:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/
18/ubs-fraud-offshore-personal-financeubs.html.
's See James B. Stuart, For UBS, a Record of Averting Prosecution,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 21, 2012, at Bl.
176 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Limited
Agrees to Plead Guilty in Connection with Long-Running Manipulation of
Libor Benchmark Interest Rates (Feb. 6, 2013), available at http://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-crm-161.html.
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rigging scandal. 77 The most recent financial institutions to succumb
to a LIBOR settlement are ICAP PLC, which U.S. and U.K.
authorities fined $87 million in September 2013, and Dutch lender
Rabobank, which U.S., Dutch, and U.K. regulators fined £774
million ($1.06 billion) in October 2013.171
Parallel to the criminal investigations by the FSA, the Criminal
and Antitrust Divisions of the DOJ has charged Alexander Hayes and
Roger Darin of UBS, and Darrell Read, Daniel Wilkinson, and Colin
Goodman of the brokerage firm ICAP, with felony wire fraud in
connection with manipulating the LIBOR benchmark rates. 179 A
UBS Subsidiary, UBS Japan, has pled:
guilty to felony wire fraud and admit[ted] its role in
manipulating [LIBOR] ....
... and has agreed to pay a $100 million fine. In
addition, UBS AG, the parent company of UBS
Japan headquartered in Zurich, has entered into a
non-prosecution agreement (NPA) with the
government requiring UBS AG to pay an
additional $400 million penalty, to admit and
accept responsibility for its misconduct as set forth
in an extensive statement of facts and to continue
cooperating with the Justice Department in its
ongoing investigation.s 0
177 See Kimberly Murphy, A Review of the LIBOR Scandal, BAKER
Borrs COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT REP. (Mar., 2013), http://www.baker
botts.com/file upload/Update201303ComplianceandEnforcementReport-LIB
OR.htm.
178 David Enrich, et al., ICAP Is Fined $87 Million in Libor Scandal,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2013, at C3; Press Release, Rabobank, Rabobank
Settles Libor and Euribor Investigations (Oct. 29, 2013), available at https://
www.rabobank.com/ en/images/20131029_Libor-settlement-EN.pdf.
179 Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hayes, 12 Mag 3229 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f292100/
292145.pdf; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, ICAP Brokers Face Felony
Charges for Alleged Long-Running Manipulation of LIBOR Interest Rates
(Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ ICAP Press Release], available at http://w
ww.justice.gov/opalpr/2013/September/13-opa-1064.html.
180 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, UBS Securities Japan Co. Ltd. to
Plead Guilty to Felony Wire Fraud for Long-Running Manipulation of
248 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 10.2
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
Similar to UBS, "RBS Securities Japan signed a plea agreement
with the government in which it admitted its criminal conduct and
agreed to pay a $50 million fine," and its parent company, RBS, was
fined an additional $100 million.'"' Finally, Barclays entered into an
agreement with the Department of Justice to pay a $160 million
penalty, accepting responsibility for its misconduct.'82 According to
the agreement, Barclays provided LIBOR and EURIBOR
submissions that, at various times, were false because they
improperly took into account either the trading positions of its
derivative traders, or reputational concerns about negative media
attention relating to its LIBOR submissions.183
The CFTCs enforcement order against Barclays under the
Commodity Exchange Act, which specifically stated that, "Barclays
regularly attempted to manipulate and knowingly delivered false,
misleading or knowingly inaccurate reports concerning U.S. Dollar
LIBOR, and at times, Yen and Sterling LIBOR," provided the basis
for much of the subsequent LIBOR-related litigation.184 LIBOR
contributor banks have faced an avalanche of LIBOR-related lawsuits
by investors, local governments, and state regulators under a variety
of legal theories: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Antitrust
Act, civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), the Securities Exchange Act, the Commodity Exchange Act,
and various state laws, as well as allegations of common law fraud
and shareholder derivative suits.
The Mayor of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Council, the City of
New Britain Firefighters, and the Police Benefit Fund of Connecticut
filed the first action over LIBOR rigging against the banks involved
in submitting the LIBOR rates in New York federal court in August
2011.185 In their complaint, the plaintiffs stated that the City of
LIBOR Benchmark Interest Rates (Dec. 19, 2012), available at http://www.j
ustice .ov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-ag-i 522.html.
1 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, RBS Securities Japan Sentenced for
Manipulation of Yen LIBOR (Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://www.just
ice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2014/302785.htm.
182 U.S. DOJ Barclays Press Release, supra note 78.
183 Id.
184 In re Barclays, supra note 58, at* 9.
185 Sara Forden & Patricia Hurtado, Baltimore, Pension Fund
Consolidate Libor Suit in N. Y, BLOOMBERG (May 1, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://w
ww.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-0 I/baltimore-pension-fund-consolidate-li
bor-suit-in-new-york-1-.html; In re: LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments
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Baltimore purchased hundreds of millions of dollars of derivatives
tied to LIBOR while the New Britain Firefighters and Police Benefit
Fund purchased tens of millions. 1 86 In particular, the plaintiffs in the
class action alleged that the member banks caused LIBOR to be
calculated at artificially low rates, allowing the member banks to
lower interest payments on their own investments, thus allowing the
member banks to reduce their own borrowing and investment costs
by billions of dollars.'8 7 Berkshire Bank, with eleven branches in
New York and New Jersey and about $881 million in assets, claimed
in a proposed class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in New
York that the rigging of LIBOR affected "hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of dollars" of loans made or sold in the Berkshire Bank's
lawsuit aimed to remove one of those hurdles of antitrust law by
alleging the LIBOR banks breached the common law of fraud under
New York state law. 188 Small community banks also added to the
wave of litigation aimed at the LIBOR contributor banks.'8 9 The
Community Bank & Trust of Sheboygan (CBTS) initiated a class-
action suit against the LIBOR contributor banks on behalf of other
small community banks. 190 The lawsuit alleged that the LIBOR
manipulation resulted in losses of over $1 billion of loans to small
businesses set at artificially low rates.1 9' Because small banks rely
more on interest income, any manipulation complaint subsequently
consolidated with three other proposed LIBOR class actions accusing
the LIBOR contributor banks of antitrust law violations. 192
Antitrust Litigation MDL 2262, US.D.C., Southern District of New York,
HAUSFELD (May 2012), http://www.hausfeldlip.com/pages/current-investigat
ions/549/libor.
186 See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F.
Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
187 See Alistair Osborne, Banks Face Billions ofDollars of Claims After
Barclays Settles, TELEGRAPH (June 27, 2012, 8:45 PM), http://www.teleg
raph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9360485/Banks-face-billi
ons-of-dollars-of-claims-after-Barclays-settles.html.
189 Tom Hals, Analysis: Wall Street May Face Libor Legal Threat from





192 See In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 935 F.
Supp. 2d 666, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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On August 12, 2011, the various class-action complaints
consolidated with over forty other complaints into a multi-district
litigation before Judge Naomi Buchwald in the Southern District of
New York.193 The claims ranged from losses resulting from LIBOR-
based derivatives and options contracts to retail loans tied to
LIBOR. 194 Other plaintiffs included various municipalities,
commodities traders, investors, bondholders, and Charles Schwab
Corporation (Schwab).'95 On March 29, 2013, U.S. District Judge
Buchwald, in a 161-page opinion, dismissed anti-trust and
racketeering claims made by Schwab and two of the class actions on
behalf of LIBOR-tied securities and derivatives traders.196 Judge
Buchwald's opinion did not completely halt litigants and allowed
commodities manipulation claims to proceed under the Commodity
Exchange Act.197 In addition, Judge Buchwald seemed to endorse a
potential securities fraud claim by the plaintiffs in the future. 198
Subsequently, Schwab filed an action in San Francisco County
Superior Court pleading multiple causes of action against Bank of
America for several LIBOR-related damages, including fraud, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment violation of the California's trade
practices statute, and federal securities law claims. 99
Other litigations have, to date, reached similar conclusions.
Similar to the status of the antitrust and racketeering claims by
Schwab, on May 13, 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern
District of New York dismissed a securities class action against
Barclays.2 00 In this litigation, plaintiffs were purchasers of American
Depository Receipts (ADRs). 20' The ADR investors alleged that
Barclays manipulated the LIBOR benchmark and made material
misrepresentations to the company's shareholders regarding its
compliance with their operational risk management processes.202 In
' In re LIBOR, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
194 id.
19 5 id.
'.. Id. at 685.
Id. at 715-19.
Id. at 726-27.
1 See Brief of Defendants, Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. CV-13-2244 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2013).
200 See Complaint, Gusinsky v. Barclays PLC, No. 12-cv-5329
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2012).
201 id
202 id
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her holding, Judge Scheindlin found that Barclays' statements
regarding its business practices were "mere 'puffery."' 203 In addition,
Judge Scheindlin found that even if Barclays' statements regarding
LIBOR were not puffery, the plaintiffs failed to connect the bank's
statements to its LIBOR settlement processes.204 Unlike Judge
Buchwald, Judge Scheindlin did not grant the plaintiffs leave to
amend their complaint. 205
Despite the rulings in the federal courts, over thirty states'
attorneys general are investigating whether to pursue state law claims
against the LIBOR contributor banks. To date, the state attorneys
general of Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New York have
submitted legal notices to RBS, HSBC, Barclays, Citigroup,
Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, and UBS that they are under
investigation for LIBOR manipulation. 206 Other local governments
have been keenly following the status of these litigations and
continue to consider potential lawsuits.207 Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae, U.S. government-sponsored entities responsible for the
expansion of the mortgage secondary market, have sued over a dozen
LIBOR contributor banks, as well as the BBA, for $800 million in
damages in connection with LIBOR rigging.208
203 Matthew Popowsky, Judge Scheindlin Dismisses LIBOR-Based




205 Gusinsky, No. 12-cv-5329.
206See Seven Banks Subpoenaed in Libor Investigation, CNBC (Aug.
15, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/48678563 ("UBS filed a report
with regulators on 31 July saying that agencies, including state attorneys
general, were examining whether it and other banks had tried to manipulate
the rate. Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase also declined to comment."); Chris
Isidore & Logan Burruss, States Weighing Libor Scandal Suits, CNN MONEY
(July 16, 2012, 1:07 PM), http://money.cnn.cofm/2012/07/16/news/economy/
libor-states/.
207 State and municipality litigation looks likely to be a result of local
government investment in derivatives. In America, 40 states allow
municipalities to enter into swap agreements. Randall Dodd, Municipal
Bombs, FIN. & DEv., June 2010, at 33. The IMF calculated the market was
worth up to $500 billion in 2010. Id.
208 See Jean Eaglesham et al., Freddie Mac Sues Big Banks on Libor,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2013, at Cl; Jonathan Stempel, Fannie Mae Sues Nine
Banks for Rigging Libor, REUTERS, (Oct. 31, 2013, 9:14 PM), http://www
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Despite claims that LIBOR litigation could very well become
"the asbestos claim of this century," 209 it is unclear how far the
remaining LIBOR-related litigations will proceed. The dismissal of
the class-action suits against contributor LIBOR banks has slowed
the wave of litigation with respect to LIBOR manipulation.
Nevertheless, every month seems to bring new investigations,
settlements, and lawsuits over the scandal. As of the writing of this
article, ICAP has become the most recent financial institution to be
fined for its involvement in the scandal. 210 Lost in the discussions
over the status of LIBOR litigation is the reform to date of the
LIBOR process. Although recently enacted changes to the regulation
of the LIBOR settlement process have increased transparency to a
certain extent, without additional changes to the LIBOR calculation
and review processes, LIBOR manipulation will continue to be a risk
for market participants, potentially impacting anyone with a credit
card balance, small business loan, or mortgage. Moreover, despite
settlements with U.S. and U.K. regulatory authorities, it is uncertain
whether the eventual settlement and litigation costs will be high
enough to create a self-policing culture at the banks.
C. LIBOR REFORMS
1. THE WHEATLEY REPORT
Following the settlement by Barclays, the U.K. Treasury
appointed Martin Wheatley, the managing director of the FSA, to
review the LIBOR settlement process and evaluate potential options
for reforming the LIBOR system.21 1 On September 28, 2012, the
"Wheatley Report" was issued. The report included a ten-point plan
.reuters.com/article/2013/11/0 1/us-fanniemaeliboridUSBRE99U 17F2013110
l?irpc=932 (naming the nine banks sued by Fannie Mae as Barclays,
Rabobank, RBS, UBS, Bank of America, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche
Bank and JPMorgan Chase).
209 See Jean Eaglesham, New York Lender Files Libor Lawsuit, Wall St.
J., July 30, 2012, at Cl (quoting James Cox, a law professor at Duke
University, that "'LIBOR could well be the asbestos claims of this century,"'
and "'[m]isreporting an index used around the world [has] ginormous'
ramifications").
210 Criminal Complaint, United States v. Hayes, 12 Mag 3229 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f292100/29214
5.pdf; DOJ ICAP Press Release, supra note 179.
211 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3.
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for immediately reforming the LIBOR system rather than abolishing
LIBOR as a benchmark entirely. 212 The ten-point plan of the
Wheatley Report can be broken down into three major areas of
reform: (1) increasing regulation of LIBOR and providing for
criminal sanctions in the case of manipulation; (2) strengthening the
governance and oversight of the LIBOR settlement process; and (3)
strengthening the LIBOR mechanism with immediate reforms to the
LIBOR settlement process.213
First, because LIBOR submissions were not regulated activities
under the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (FSMA), the
Wheatley Report proposed the formulation of new criminal and civil
sanctions for manipulation or attempted manipulation of LIBOR,
thereby including LIBOR manipulation within the scope of market
abuse for the first time.214 The Wheatley Report analyzed the current
state of the FSMA, providing the FSA with the power to prosecute
certain criminal offenses. In particular, Section 397 of the FSMA
allowed the FSA to prosecute parties for misleading statements and
215practices. 2 However, the Wheatley Report concluded that the
manipulation and attempted manipulation of LIBOR (or any other
benchmarks) would not constitute an offense under Section 397 of
the FSMA because the misleading statements or practices had to be
undertaken either for the purpose of inducing another to take certain
specific steps in relation to certain agreements or investments, or
with recklessness as to whether that will be the result.216 The
Wheatley Report thereby concluded that it would be unlikely that
Section 397 of the FSMA could apply to any manipulation or
attempted manipulation of LIBOR submissions because the LIBOR
manipulation affected pre-existing contracts, or was done to avoid
negative publicity regarding the liquidity of the offending party.217
Accordingly, the Wheatley Report recommended that the U.K.
Parliament amend Section 397 of the FSMA to address benchmark
manipulation. 218
212 id
213 Id at 5.
214id
215 Id at 18-19.216 d217id
218 id
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Second, the Wheatley Report made several recommendations
designed to strengthen the institutions governing the LIBOR process.
Noting the BBA's close ties with the LIBOR contributor banks, the
Wheatley Report recommended that a new and independent private
administrator be selected through a transparent tendering process. 219
In order to improve transparency, the new administrator would be
responsible for: (1) collecting and distributing LIBOR submissions;
and (2) scrutinizing LIBOR contributor banks to guarantee the
integrity of their LIBOR submissions. 220 In addition to the new
administrator, the Wheatley Report also recommended the
establishment of an independent oversight committee, which would
verify LIBOR submissions via input from additional market
participants. 221 This new oversight committee would be responsible
for creating a new code of conduct for all parties involved in the
LIBOR settlement process.222 The new code of conduct would
formalize the LIBOR setting process and establish internal controls
to prevent future LIBOR manipulation.223 To increase transparency,
the new oversight committee would also publish the names of
LIBOR contributor members, their declared conflicts of interests, and
the minutes of any meetings.224
Finally, the Wheatley Report recommended an array of
immediate reforms designed to restore confidence in the LIBOR
submission process. To limit the ability of the member banks to
predict LIBOR submissions, and therefore reduce the possibility of
manipulation, the Wheatley Report recommended that the
publication of all LIBOR submissions be delayed for a period of at
least three months.225 In order to increase transparency and improve
the integrity of the LIBOR submissions process, the Wheatley Report
emphasized that the contributor banks consider actual transactions
when calculating their LIBOR submissions. 226 Examples of this
transactional information include intervals between transactions and
times of transaction submission.227 For those currencies and tenors
2 1 91 d at 22-23.
220 id.
221 id.
222 Id at 24.
223 Id at 25.
224 Id at 32.2251 d at 38.
226 Id at 28.
227 Id at 35.
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where there is insufficient data to corroborate submissions, the
Wheatley Report proposed ceasing submissions. 228 The Wheatley
Report also recommended that market participants review current
contracts for adequate contingency provisions in case LIBOR
benchmarks become unavailable. 229 In the event that LIBOR
benchmarks are unavailable, it recommended that other industry
associations, such as the International Swaps and Derivatives
Associate and the Loan Market Association, provide for market
contingencies, including the use of other non-LIBOR benchmarks. 230
To address the market's lack of confidence in the accuracy of the
LIBOR benchmark, the Wheatley Report recommended an increase
in the number of banks contributing to the LIBOR panel.231 Under
the pre-scandal regime, on any given day, the LIBOR submissions of
between eight and ten banks governed the final U.S. dollar LIBOR
benchmark.232 Expanding the number of banks contributing to the
U.S. dollar LIBOR calculation process would, theoretically, make
collusive behavior between banks more difficult to achieve.233 In
addition, more banks contributing to the LIBOR calculation process
would add additional data of market costs, and would theoretically
make the final LIBOR benchmark reflect actual transaction costs. 234
Another proposed change, designed to increase confidence that
LIBOR submissions would be less susceptible to manipulation, was
to keep all LIBOR submissions confidential for a three-month
period. 235 This silent period is designed to limit potential collusion
between individual bankers, as well as prevent the possibility of
reputational concerns influencing daily LIBOR submissions.
On October 17, 2012, the Financial Secretary of the U.K.
Treasury, Greg Clark, stated that the Wheatley Report Reforms
228 Id. at 38.
2291 d. at 39.
230 Id. at 39.
231 Id. at 38.
232 See The Basics,, supra note 2.
233 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3, at 38. Prior to the Wheatley
Review, between sixteen and twenty major banks determined the U.S. dollar
LIBOR rate on a daily basis. See US Dollar Panel, supra note 32.234 See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3, at 38.
235 See Interim Libor Oversight Comm., Comm. Minutes for June 20,
2013, BBA LIBOR (Aug. 30, 2013), www.bbalibor.com/download/9212.
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would be implemented.236 Although outside the scope of this article,
the Wheatley Report is widely used as a framework for benchmark
reform in other jurisdictions as well. 237
2. LEGISLATIVE AND MARKET REFORMS
As the LIBOR contributor banks, lawyers, and litigants struggle
with lawsuits and legal settlements over damages resulting from
LIBOR manipulation, U.K. regulatory authorities and the BBA have
moved to enact portions of the Wheatley Report. 238 The Wheatley
Report proposals were enacted in order to: (1) reform the LIBOR
calculation process itself; (2) prevent related future market calamity;
and (3) restore market confidence.239 On April 1, 2013, the Financial
Services Act 2012 went into effect, which replaced the FSA in early
2014 with a new regulatory body, the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA). 240 The objective of the FCA is to promote effective
competition in the financial services markets and to protect consumer
interests. 241 To do this, the FCA has the power to intervene
temporarily in the financial markets to block imminent financial
product launches or to stop existing financial products. 242 If it is in
the interests of consumers, the FCA can require companies to
immediately withdraw or amend any misleading financial
236 Press Release, HM Treasury, Government Accepts
Recommendations from the Wheatley Review of LIBOR in Full (Oct. 17,
2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-accep
ts-recommendations-from-the-wheatley-review-of-libor-in-full.
237 See ECON. CONSULTATIVE COMM., BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, TOWARDS BETTER REFERENCE RATE PRACTICES: A
CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE, 14-15 (2013), available at http://www.bis.
org/publ/othpl9.pdf; TREASURY MARKETS Assoc., REPORT ON THE HONG
KONG INTERBANK OFFERED RATE 3 (2012), available at http://www.tma.or
g.hk/ubfile/hibor%20review%20report%20%20english.pdf.
8 This portion of the Article will not address criminal and civil
penalties for LIBOR fraud enacted by the U.K.
239 Written Ministerial Statement, HM Treasury, Wheatley Review of
LIBOR (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20130129110402/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/wmsfst_171012.pdf.
240 Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, Part 1(A) (U.K.) (amending the
FSMA).
241 Id. at Part 1(B).
242 id.
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promotions.243 The FCA will publicize its enforcement proceedings
against companies for violating or failing to comply with financial
rules.24
Following the recommendations of the Wheatley Report, the
Financial Services Act 2012 has amended certain provisions of the
FSMA in order to address the actions of traders and bankers with
respect to the LIBOR scandal.245 First, the Financial Services Act
2012 amended Section 22 and Schedule 2 of the FSMA to include
benchmark-related activities as "regulated activities" under the
FSMA.246 In particular, new provisions that specifically address the
offense of providing misleading statements that give benchmark-
related impressions have replaced Section 397 of the FSMA. 247 The
new provision criminalizes the following: (1) any person who
knowingly or recklessly makes a false or misleading statement to
another with the intention that the statement is used for setting a
relevant benchmark; and (2) any person who, by a course of conduct,
intends to, and knowingly or recklessly does, create a false or
misleading impression as to the price of any investment or
transaction with an interest rate that may affect the setting of a
relevant benchmark.248 At present, LIBOR is the only benchmark




246 Id. at Part 2, (7)(1)(a) (defining a regulated activity to mean "an
activity of a specified kind which is carried on by way of business and relates
to (a) information about a person's financial standing, or (b) the setting of a
specified benchmark").
247 Id. The previous Section 397 of the FSMA addressed market abuses,
allowing the FSA to take criminal action against parties for making
misleading statements or engaging in conduct designed to induce another
person to take action (or not) in a specific way in connection with certain
agreements or investments. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c.
8, § 397 (U.K.). Misleading statements include reckless statements that
likely lead to the same result. But see THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3
(considering the former iteration of Section 397 to be too narrowly designed
to cover benchmark manipulation).
248 See Financial Services Act, 2012, c. 21, Part 1(A) (U.K.) (amending
the FSMA).
249 The U.K. Treasury is responsible for determining which benchmarks
will be subject to regulation. See Financial Services & Markets Act, 2000, c.
22 (U.K.). In addition to LIBOR, benchmarks subject to future regulation
258 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 10.2
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS
The FCA has the power to review the systems and controls for
LIBOR of all LIBOR contributor banks. 250 As part of the reforms,
the FCA requires banks to appoint an individual, to be approved by
the FCA, who will be responsible for compliance with the new
LIBOR procedures. 251 The FCA rules require the new LIBOR
compliance officer to contact the FCA immediately upon any
discovery of manipulation, or attempted manipulation, of a
benchmark.252 In addition, LIBOR contributor banks will implement
new internal policies and procedures to prevent future
manipulation.253 These new policies include: (1) establishing an
internal code of conduct relating to appropriate LIBOR submissions;
(2) appointing an oversight committee to administer and review
LIBOR submissions; (3) creating a process for managing conflicts of
interest relating to LIBOR submissions; (4) keeping a five-year
record of all LIBOR submissions; and (5) appointing an independent
auditor that will review the bank's compliance procedures and make
annual reports to the FCA.254
Following the implementation of the Wheatley Report reforms,
the HM Treasury, the U.K.'s economic and finance ministry, and the
FCA selected NYSE Euronext Rate Administration, a subsidiary of
NYSE Euronext, as the successor to the BBA.255 In January 2014,
the BBA formally divested itself from the ownership and regulation
of LIBOR and transfer the structural management of LIBOR to
NYSE Euronext.256
under the amended FSMA may include any public index, rate, or price that is
used for one or more of a range of purposes (such as to measure the
performance of investments) with no requirement that this purpose be its
main or dominant purpose. See Id.
250 See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. HANDBOOK MAR 8.2 (2014) [hereinafter
FCA HANDBOOK], available at http://media.fshandbook.info/content/FCAIM
AR/8/2.pdf.
251 Id at MAR 8.2.3.
252 Id. at MAR 8.2.9.
253 Id. at MAR 8.2.
254 Id
255 See David Enrich et al., NYSE Euronext to Buy LIBOR, WALL ST. J.,
July 10, 2013, at Cl.
256 id.
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III. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
THE NEW LIBOR SYSTEM
Although the enacted Wheatley Report reforms and the new
ownership of the LIBOR-setting process may increase transparency,
it is uncertain whether these changes can truly prevent future
manipulation or restore market confidence in the LIBOR calculation
process. This section of the Article will discuss the enacted reforms
that may have negative, unintended consequences, or will not result
in increasing certainty in the LIBOR calculation process.
Specifically, this section of the article will review the following
reforms: (1) the discontinuation of certain tenors from the LIBOR
calculation process; (2) the mechanisms used to tie LIBOR to actual
transaction costs; (3) the transfer of LIBOR oversight from the BBA
to NYSE Euronext; and (4) the three-month period of confidentiality
before the public release of LIBOR benchmarks. Following an
analysis of each of these specific changes to the LIBOR process, this
section of the Article will propose additional reforms or changes
necessary to meet the goals of increased certainty and transparency in
the LIBOR methodology.
A. DISCONTINUED CURRENCIES AND TENORS
The Wheatley Report recommended a significant reduction in a
number of LIBOR currencies and tenors that had little to no value in
global markets or are prohibitively difficult to assess in comparison
to actual market rates. 257 By eliminating these LIBOR calculations,
the Wheatley Report drafters hoped to move market actors into
tenors with meaningful market activity, resulting in fewer rate quotes
and greater accuracy with respect to actual market costs.258 As a
result, the BBA has discontinued eight LIBOR tenors: the two-week,
four-month, five-month, seven-month, eight-month, nine-month, ten-
month, and eleven-month tenors. 259 In addition, the BBA has
stopped quoting LIBOR in the following currencies and indexes:
257 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3.258 d
259 See Gavin Finch, BBA Reduces LIBOR Rates After Scandal,
BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2013, 1:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20
13-06-03/bba-reduces-libor-rates-after-scandal.html.
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Canadian dollars, Australian dollars, New Zealand dollars, Swedish
krona, Danish krone, and the sterling repo index. 260
Although the reason for the discontinuance in certain currencies
and tenors may be to increase efficiency and to limit the submissions
in tenors that are difficult to affirm, there are several negative
consequences that may affect market participants. First, the
contractual documentation for existing transactions that are tied to
these existing tenors will likely need to be amended. If the
underlying transaction documents already provide for the use of an
alternative reference rate when LIBOR becomes unavailable, then
this may never be an issue for those parties with well-prepared
documents. Prior to the widespread notoriety of the LIBOR scandal,
however, it is unclear to what extent parties prepared for alternative
benchmarks in their documentation. As a result, an unknown cost of
due diligence and additional negotiations may accrue in order to
switch to a new benchmark. Moreover, with respect to certain
market participants, counterparties may interpret any change to the
LIBOR benchmark in their documents as a materially adverse effect,
allowing counterparties to select whether to honor contractual
obligations.261 As a result, certain market participants fear that the
LIBOR reforms risk invalidating their contracts.262 To date, industry
groups have provided several unsatisfactory options for market
participants affected by these changes.263 With respect to those
agreements where the tenor used has been eliminated, it has been
suggested that market participants select the "closest" remaining
260 See Libor Becomes a Regulated Activity, BBA LIBOR (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://www.bbalibor.com/news/libor-becomes-a-regulated-activity.
261See Guy C. Dempsey Jr., LIBOR Discontinuation Guidance from
ISDA, CORP. & FIN. WKLY. DIG. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.corporatef
inancialweeklydigest.com/2013/03/articles/otc-derivatives/libor-discontinuati
on-guidance-from-isda/.
262 See Guidance Note, ISDA, LIBOR Currency/Maturities
Discontinuation (March 25, 2013) (showing that the ISDA, the International
Swaps and Derivatives Association, has released this guidance letter to
parties using their standardized interest rate swap documentation), available
at http//www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch=1&keyword=libor (follow
"LIBOR Discontinuations Guidance" hyperlink). In this guidance note,
ISDA specifically provides that each counterparty has to agree to the
proposed form amendment drafted in response to these changes in tenors and
maturities. See id.
263 id
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tenor. 264 For those market participants using LIBOR set to
terminated currencies, the suggested options are rather stark: agree
to a substitute rate, or terminate the transactions entirely.265
Finally, there has been very little consideration regarding
whether it is appropriate to limit market participants' freedom to
contract around these tenors, or any other type of benchmark.
Removing wholesale currencies from the calculation of LIBOR
forces market participants to trade or hedge their risks in currencies
they may not desire, or that do not actually represent the underlying
risks in the related transaction. Market rates and currencies are not
static objects, and what may be a "stable" tenor today may not be so
stable tomorrow. 266 Moreover, the prohibition or limitation of any
benchmark from use by private financial actors is likely to stifle
innovation in developing new financial products and limit
competition. Either of these results could increase consumer costs in
the future.
Rather than providing a three-month to six-month period for
terminating these tenors and currencies, market participants should
be allowed to "opt-in" to continued LIBOR reports in these
currencies and tenors, and to waive any associated risks. Given the
types of currencies and tenors being eliminated due to a lack of
widespread use, it seems likely that parties using these currencies and
tenors are sophisticated financial institutions. Similar to the use of
264 id265 d
266 The value and popularity of a currency are constantly changing
factors, typically dependent on a country's economic and political stability,
its current account surplus or deficit, as well as the amount of debt it has
issued. See Eswar Prasad & Lei Ye, The Renminbi's Prospects as a Global
Reserve Currency, 33 CATO J. 563 (2013). Reserve currencies are an
example of how currencies gain and lose popularity over time. A reserve
currency is the chosen currency used and held by governments and financial
institutions for international transactions. See Eduardo Porter, Tremors and
Trepidation: Imagining the Dollar Without Its Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2013, at Bl. Prior to the development of the U.S. dollar as the primary
international reserve currency, the British Pound held the role. See id
Economists and political scientists frequently contemplate the Chinese
Renminbi, or Yuan; or even the cryptocurency, the Bitcoin, as potential
future reserve currencies. See id; Mark T. Williams, Bitcoin Will Crash To
$10 by Mid-2014, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2013 5:18 PM), http://www.bus
inessinsider.com/williams-bitcoin-meltdown-10-2013-12.
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the "accredited investor" standard used in private securities
267transactions, parties can use a certification and waiver, if those
parties prefer to use LIBOR tied to these currencies and tenors. This
suggested reform has the benefit of allowing financial institutions
and investors the choice of keeping their documentation the same, or
going through the process of amending their documentation and the
associated costs, rather than forcing these parties to adopt new and
unexpected risks and costs. In addition, the use of a waiver provides
little in the way of additional expense.
Although a certification and waiver process may be the easiest
resolution for the unintended consequences of terminating certain
LIBOR currencies and tenors, NYSE Euronext should move to make
the transition away from these terminated LIBOR currencies and
tenors easier for those financial institutions and investors that are
facing new risks associated with this change. For any of those
borrowers, lenders, and hedge counterparties who rely on the
terminated LIBOR currencies and tenors, a more orderly transition
would be beneficial. A greater transition period, perhaps as long as
one-to-five years, should be provided to reflect the term length of
these contracts. Providing a longer transition period to the remaining
LIBOR currencies and tenors would limit the negative costs
associated with sudden, and perhaps terminal, changes made to the
relevant financial actors.
267 Accredited Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.
gov/answers/accred.htm (last visited June 6, 2014) (showing in general, the
accredited investor rule is a U.S. securities rule designed to prohibit any
investor other than an "accredited investor" from purchasing securities that
are exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (public
registration under the act theoretically providing to all investors, accredited
or otherwise, all of the information material to an investment decision)). An
accredited investor is a person (i) whose individual net worth or joint net
worth with that person's spouse, at the time of his or her purchase of a
private security, exceeds $1,000,000 (excluding the value of his or her
primary residence); or (ii) who had an individual income in excess of
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with that
person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years, and has a
reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year.
In exempt, or non-public, securities offerings, accredited investors are
required to certify that they fulfill the requirements of being an accredited
investor. Id.
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B. SETTING LIBOR To ACTUAL MARKET RATES
In order to restore the credibility of the banking system and the
LIBOR calculation process, the Wheatley Report recommended that
market participants use a new or revised benchmark based on actual
lending data to set LIBOR.268 As part of a new LIBOR calculation
process, the FCA requires LIBOR contributor banks to confirm
LIBOR's correlation with other financial data.269 Setting LIBOR to
corresponding lending data would, theoretically, allow market
participants to borrow and lend money at honest and accurate prices.
However, this raises two fundamental questions: (1) what are "actual
market rates;" and (2) how are these actual market rates collected and
calculated?
To date, it is unclear what exact changes NYSE Euronext, as the
new manager of LIBOR, may require from banks when setting
LIBOR. However, NYSE Euronext has indicated that it will require
future LIBOR calculations to be "anchored" to actual market rates.270
Market watchers have suggested several options for tying LIBOR to
real market costs. For example, it has been recommended that
contributor banks use the overnight index swap rate, which reflects
the overnight rate at which banks lend to each other, as a data set for
LIBOR calculations. 271 Alternatively, banks also could utilize rates
used for short-term secured financings between banks and
commercial borrowers.
These suggestions have received mixed reactions from banks.272
Certain financial analysts have critiqued resistance by contributor
268 THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3.
269 FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 250.
270 See NYSE Euronext's Comments on the European Commission's
Proposal for a Regulation on Indices Used as Benchmarks in Financial
Instruments and Financial Contracts, NYSE EURONEXT, 3.15 (Nov. 11,
2013), http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_market/consultations/2012/benchmarks/re
gistered-organisations/nyse-euronext en.pdf.
271 Editorial, Bloomberg Saying Goodbye to Libor Won't Be Easy but
it's Necessary, BLOOMBERG (July 23, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2012-07-23/saying-goodbye-to-libor-won-t-be-easy-but-it-s-
necessary.html.
272 See Wheatley Review: Reaction from the City, FIN. NEWS (Sept. 28,
2012), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-09-28/martin-wheatley-li
bor-report-city-of-london-reaction.
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banks to this change as suspicious. 273 However, one weakness in this
proposal is that there are certain situations where market pricing for
lending in certain tenors is difficult to base on actual transactions.2 74
Obviously, the Wheatley Report and related FCA reforms have tried
to address this concern by eliminating tenors and currencies that have
little to no market impact. However, tying LIBOR to actual market
rates may become problematic during periods of high volatility or in
certain markets where there is little to no trading. In addition,
moving to actual market data may create market disruptions while
contributor banks create a consensus on the new market
methodologies for a reality-based LIBOR. One solution is to make
LIBOR benchmarks contingent, rather than based, on actual market
data.275 Rather than making LIBOR a "Frankenstein" benchmark put
together from a variety of transaction data, LIBOR submissions
could simply be contingent on the existence of actual trading data.
This might involve further elimination of any tenors or currencies
where no trading or markets exist, which creates its own unintended
consequences. As this reform requires extensive knowledge of the
markets and types of transactions that rely on LIBOR benchmarks, it
seems appropriate that this potential reform be the responsibility of
NYSE Euronext working with the LIBOR panel banks.
Rather than completely eliminating expert judgment by the
banks when setting LIBOR, banks could use a variety of options.
First, proposed rates by the banks could be arbitraged against market
rates. This would allow banks to continue to use their judgment
when initially setting their LIBOR benchmarks; using the market
arbitrage as a hedge to prevent speculation or inappropriate
exuberance from pushing the LIBOR benchmark beyond what the
actual market would allow. The process of "interpolation or
extrapolation from available data" should become public and market-
standard among each contributor bank.276 For example, the LIBOR
contributor banks could, in addition to eliminating the upper and
lower quartile of proposed benchmarks, use a limit on the amount by
273 See Liam Vaughan & Gavin Finch, Libor Guardians Said to Resist




275 See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3, at 6, 43-44
(recommending "actual trade data" when setting future LIBOR benchmarks).
276 See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 3, at 28.
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which the final LIBOR benchmark for a given day deviates from
actual market data. This deviation could be measured in basis points,
or full percentage points, as determined by NYSE Euronext. In
addition, the deviation should be flexible, dependent on transaction
size and tenor.
Additional factors that influence the calculation of actual market
rates include the size of the markets measured, the types of
transactions used as marks, and the timing of the measurements.
Including more financial actors in the setting of LIBOR could
potentially increase accuracy.277 Rather than the limited number of
contributor banks used to date, NYSE Euronext could include an
application or review process designed to add additional contributor
banks. Including more banks in the submission and calculation of
LIBOR would reduce the impact of any future individual fraudulent
submissions, as well as provide a more accurate picture of the
financial markets as of the date of the submissions.
Another method for creating additional certainty would be to add
another factor in calculating LIBOR. Rather than simply using tenor
and currency as factors, LIBOR calculations could also include the
amounts being loaned as an indicator of lending costs. Adding the
loan amounts would help add certainty that LIBOR benchmarks were
more indicative of the actual market. Finally, another factor that
could be included to increase certainty in the LIBOR benchmark
would be the timing of the loans. In today's 24-hour global markets,
significant movements in lending prices occur based on which
markets are active. Rather than the current model of using 11:00 AM
GST as the time for submissions, additional LIBOR benchmarks
could be used to take into account the time that other markets are
actually open and trading. For example, 11:00 AM EST and 11:00
AM Tokyo time could be used as additional factors in determining
certain LIBOR benchmarks. Factoring additional considerations of
more contributor banks, loan size, and timing would increase market
participant faith in future LIBOR benchmarks.
277 See Saskia van Ewijk & Ivo Arnold, How Bank Business Models
Drive Interest Margins: Evidence from US. Bank-Level Data 3 (De
Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper No. 387, 2013), available at http://
www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/Working%20Paper%20387_tcm47-295326.pdf.
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C. SUBJECTIVE FACTORS STILL INFLUENCE LIBOR SuBMIssioNs
Until the adoption of the Wheatley Report's proposal of
removing responsibility for LIBOR setting from the BBA, LIBOR
setting was largely self-regulated. 278 To date, reaction to the
movement of LIBOR from the BBA to NYSE Euronext has largely
been favorable.279 In addition, the enacted Wheatley Report reforms
have significantly increased the level of government oversight over
the LIBOR calculation process. However, it is unclear whether the
enacted Wheatley reforms will prevent future manipulation or restore
market confidence in the banking system. Specifically, the ability of
regulators to evaluate the accuracy of LIBOR is questionable given
that LIBOR is a benchmark and not necessarily tied to any actual
transaction data, even with new requirements that LIBOR be tied to
objective criteria. Moreover, even with additional regulatory
oversight, subjective criteria can still influence the rates, leaving the
potential for future manipulation.
The overdue regulatory attention to the LIBOR settlement
process is welcome. However, there is an underlying issue regarding
the extent regulatory authorities can actually monitor and enforce
compliance on a benchmark that is "the rate at which banks do not
lend to each other . . . [and] is not a rate at which anyone is actually
borrowing." 280 LIBOR is, after all, a benchmark based on a
hypothetical cost of lending between banks and not an actual interest
rate. The FCA has implemented guidelines for how LIBOR
contributor banks are to calculate an "accurate" LIBOR submission.
Pursuant to MAR 8.2.6 of the new FCA Handbook:
A benchmark submitter must:
278 See Alex Barker & Kara Scannell, EU Libor Plan that Ends Era of
Self-Regulation, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2013, 11:24 PM), http://www.ft.com/in
tl/cms/s/0/4184a0d8-ceb3-1 le2-ae25-00144feab7de.html#axzz2wBM7KNE
5.
279 See Lindsay Fortado & Nandini Sukumar, NYSE Euronext to Take
Over Administration of Libor From BBA, BLOOMBERG (July 9, 2013, 8:16
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-09/nyse-euronext-said-to-ta
ke-on-oversight-of-libor-from-u-k-bba.html; Kirstin Ridley, NYSE Euronext
to Take Over Scandal-Hit Libor, REUTERS (July 9, 2013, 5:23 PM), http://ww
w.reuters.com/article/2013/07/09/us-libor-nyse-idUSBRE9680FD2 0130709.
280 Stephanie Flanders, Inconvenient Truths About Libor, BBC NEWS
(July 4, 2012, 3:19 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-your-money-1
8701623.
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(1) ensure that its benchmark submissions
are determined using an effective
methodology to establish the benchmark
submission on the basis of objective
criteria and relevant information; and
(2) review this methodology as and when
market circumstances require, but at least
every quarter, to ensure that its benchmark
submissions are credible and robust.
An effective methodology for determining
benchmark submissions in addition to
quantitative criteria may include the use of
qualitative criteria, such as the expert
judgment of the benchmark submitter.281
It is not difficult to imagine that even with increased regulatory
oversight, LIBOR will not be an accurate indicator of lending costs.
How does a benchmark submitter ensure its submissions are
"credible and robust," especially when the process for setting LIBOR
allows the individual judgment of the benchmark submitter? 282
Regardless of potential, subjective influences in the rate-setting
process, markets fluctuate daily, and in periods of financial crisis it is
easy to see situations where the LIBOR benchmark may not align
with market costs, even without manipulation by self-interested
parties. Rather than making benchmark submissions a zero-sum
game of objective versus subjective determination, the new rules
tread the line between a set of accurate data and reflecting the
variable nature of trading between financial institutions in multiple
currencies, tenors, and transaction sizes. Over the long-term, it is
unclear whether the end result of this reform will actually prevent
future benchmark manipulation.
To limit the temptation of personal or reputational concerns to
impact the subjective judgment of benchmark submitters, LIBOR
contributor banks and regulatory authorities should move to
eliminate the specific incentive for traders to influence the LIBOR
benchmark-their bonuses. Rather than involve regulatory action
over private remuneration, the NYSE Euronext can propose that
LIBOR contributor banks hold bonuses to individuals that have the
ability to influence the LIBOR benchmark for a certain period of
281 FCA HANDBOOK, supra note 250, at MAR § 8.2.6.
282 id
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time. The bonus hold period would be a sufficient period of time for
the related LIBOR contributor bank to use new compliance
procedures to confirm that the individual traders had taken no
inappropriate action. Acknowledging and addressing the incentives
of individuals to submit false LIBOR benchmarks is critical for
preventing future manipulation.
D. ELIMINATING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF LIBOR SUBMISSIONS
One reform made by the BBA to the LIBOR calculation is
making the submission of the LIBOR benchmarks confidential to the
public for a three-month period. 283 Although this may seem
counterintuitive, it is widely believed that the public nature of the
LIBOR submissions by each contributor bank created the incentive
among banks to move their LIBOR submissions in order to keep up
with their peers and limit public perception of the related contributor
banks' financial distress. 284 By removing LIBOR from the public
eye, banks will no longer be tempted to push their individual LIBOR
benchmarks downward in order to conceal their negative financial
conditions. Without public scrutiny, the theory goes, banks will be
prevented from comparing recent LIBOR benchmarks from their
competitors; consequently, this information will not affect their own
LIBOR benchmark submissions. Therefore, confidentiality will
force banks to rely solely on themselves when submitting their
quotations.
The obvious unintended consequence of such confidentiality is
the removal of one leading indicator of a financial institution's health
from the public. Although there may be an argument for making
LIBOR submissions confidential, preserving negative financial
information should not be one of them. Moreover, the reasoning
behind keeping LIBOR submissions confidential fails to take into
account a primary motivation behind the LIBOR manipulation.
Individual profit, rather than protecting the reputation of their
financial institution, motivated many of the bankers involved. An
analysis of email exchanges between bank traders and LIBOR
submitters indicate that profit was a motive for moving rates, not just
283 See Finch, supra note 259; Announcement of LIBOR Changes, BBA
Libor (June 12, 2013), http://www.bbalibor.com/news/announcement-of-libo
r-changes.
284 Hay, supra note 63.
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protecting the reputation and stock price of the banks.285 Allowing
for a three-month quiet period creates the risk of bad actors using
confidentiality as a screen for future manipulation.
Another issue relating to preserving the confidence of banks'
LIBOR submissions for a three-month period is that it may well
prevent the discovery of future manipulation. The initial discovery
of collusion and manipulation of LIBOR came not from the LIBOR
administrator or regulatory authorities, but from financial watchers
who were observing the daily LIBOR submissions. Those financial
observers were able to surmise quickly how LIBOR diverged from
typical submissions that were inconsistent with other market factors.
By allowing a three-month period of silence, it seems likely that any
future manipulation would be more difficult to pinpoint, and when
discovered would already be at least three months after the fact.
For these reasons, NYSE Euronext should consider eliminating
the three-month confidentiality period. Although this period of
"quiet" may reduce certain risks associated with LIBOR
manipulation, it comes at the cost of additional public oversight of
the submissions, and adds an additional risk for LIBOR manipulation
without quick discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION
The first steps toward repairing the LIBOR calculation process
have begun. Many of the enacted reforms to the LIBOR calculation
process proposed by the Wheatley Report are substantial
improvements over the previous self-regulated system.
Unfortunately, there is still a long way to go before confidence is
fully restored. In addition to the already enacted reforms, regulators
285 One of the more amusing communications between traders and
LIBOR submitters revealed by the Barclays investigation included the
following:
Trader: What do you think you'll go for in 3 months?
Submitter: I am going 90 although 91 is what I should be
posting.
Trader: When I retire and write a book about this
business, your name will be written in golden letters.
Submitter: I would prefer not to be in any book!
LIBOR Manipulation Emails, TRADE PRACTICES (July 10, 2012),
http://tradepractices.wordpress.com/2012/07/10/libormanipulation-em ails/.
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should consider additional changes to the calculation process
including a certification or waiver process for LIBOR marks in rarely
traded tenors and currencies, eliminating the confidentiality period
for LIBOR submissions, and tie individual benchmark submitter's
salary structures to the market data reforms already enacted.
Addressing these unintended consequences with additional
amendments to the LIBOR calculation will help restore at least some
of the integrity lost by the financial institutions involved in the
LIBOR scandal and keep the recovery heading in the right direction.
